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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the role of foreign policy discourse in the construction o f Turkey’s 
Western identity during the Cold War. It examines the concept of identity through a 
constructivist perspective. In contrast to mainstream theories that treat identities as 
‘natural’, unchanging and inevitable, constmctivism maintains that identities do not 
stand ‘out there’ to be discovered, but are subject to construction and reconstruction by 
way of intersubjective understandings of actors. The thesis examines the constmction o f 
Turkey’s Western identity by analyzing articles published in the quarterly journal 
Foreign Policy, which represent the views of academic, political, and— to an extent—  
military circles on foreign policy issues. Discourse analysis is used to analyze the 
political representations of foreign policy elites and to understand the systems of 
signification associated with certain political choices. The thesis analyzes the role of the 
elite discourse that focuses on Turkey’s NATO membership in the efforts to transform 
Turkey into a ‘modem’, ‘democratic’ and ‘civilized’ Western state (inclusion), in the 
face of the ‘traditional’, ‘antidemocratic’ and ‘uncivilized’ states of the Eastern bloc 
(exclusion). In this way, the discursive elements involved in the construction o f 
Turkey’s identity that are established upon the notion of ‘difference’ (namely the closely 
linked notions of the ‘self and the ‘other’) are analyzed.
Ill
ÖZET
Bu tez, dış politika söyleminin Soğuk Savaş döneminde Türkiye’nin Batılı kimliğinin 
oluştumimasmda oynadığı rolü incelemektedir. Kimlik konstrüktivist bir bakış açısıyla 
ele alınmaktadır. Tez, konstrüktivist Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisini kullanarak, kimliği 
geleneksel Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinin savunduğu gibi önceden verilmiş, ‘doğal’ ve 
değişmeyen bir kavram olarak değil, öznelerarası ilişkiler sonucu oluşan ve değişebilen 
bir kavram olarak incelemektedir. Tez, dış politika elitlerinin kimlik temsillerini 
incelemek ve oluşturdukları öznelerarası anlamlandırma sistemlerini açıklayabilmek için 
diplomatların, dışişleri bakanlarının, akademisyenlerin ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’ne 
mensup kişilerin makalelerinin yer aldığı Dış Politika dergisinden yararlanmaktadır. 
Türkiye’nin NATO üyeliği üzerine yayınlanan yazılar incelenerek, karar verme 
mekanizmalarının bu örgüte üyelik bağlamında devlete atfettiği ‘modern’, ‘demokratik’, 
‘medeni’ ve ‘Batılı’ bir devlet olma ‘değerlerinin’ ne şekilde Doğu bloku ülkelerine 
yüklenen ‘geleneksellik’, ‘antidemokratiklik’ ve ‘gayrımedenilik’ gibi karşıt kategorilere 
dayanan ‘içerisi/dışansT ayrımı üzerine kurulduğu araştırılmaktadır. Bu şekilde, Türk 
dış politikası söyleminde ‘öteki’ ile sıkı sıkıya ilişkilendirilmiş ‘ben’, yani Türkiye 
devlet kimliğinin ‘fark’ nosyonuna dayanan söylemsel yapısı İncelenmektedir.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
States are identity-bearing entities. If we acknowledge that many characteristics o f 
identity attributed to individuals and social groups can also be ascribed to states, state 
identity appears as a significant area of analysis in International Relations (IR). Identity is 
a matter of signification, a sign that obtains meaning by its difference from other signs.’ It 
is established by acts of self-representation, but it is also a matter of assertion and 
persuasion. The extent to which assertions of identity come to be accepted by others 
makes it strong and persistent. The identity of a state is what foreign policy decision­
making mechanisms specify as a ‘self, thereby establishing what the state is and what it is 
not, its distinguishing qualities, and its place in the world among various ‘others’. In this 
sense, foreign policy becomes a mechanism for both constructing and representing a 
particular state identity.
Foreign policies are formulated by state elites who make utility calculations based 
on their political goals at both international and domestic levels. This thesis examines the 
social construction of Turkey’s Western identity by analyzing state elites’ foreign policy 
discourse on NATO. It elucidates the role played by the foreign policy discourse of elites 
in choosing, establishing and manipulating a particular perspective on Turkey’s identity. 
Since Turkey’s NATO membership constitutes one o f the milestones in the efforts to 
identify Turkey with the West, I have chosen to look at how Turkey’s Western identity 
was constructed by way of the foreign policy discourse on NATO.
The thesis adopts a constructivist analytical framework to study identity formation 
in general and the construction of Turkey’s state identity during the Cold War in 
particular. Applying the concept of identity to the analysis, this thesis proposes a different 
way to study foreign policy from that of mainstream approaches. Mainstream IR theories 
take identities and interests as given; constructivism takes issue with them. In contrast to 
mainstream theories, constructivism is about questioning what is taken as natural, 
unchanging and inevitable by mainstream theories. Constructivists argue that identities 
and interests do not stand ‘out there’ to be discovered, but are subject to construction 
and reconstruction by way of intersubjective understandings. They maintain that identities 
and interests result from social interaction among actors. As such, identities are subject to 
change through the policymaking process. Building upon this constructivist framework of 
identity formation, the thesis addresses four basic research questions: What is the 
perspective developed by constructivism on the construction of identity? What do we 
understand from the concept ‘state identity’? What is the role played by foreign policy in 
constructing a particular state identity? And what was the role played by Turkey’s foreign 
policy discourse on NATO in the construction of Turkey’s Western identity during the 
Cold War?
The thesis argues that foreign policy is not only the conduct of diplomatic 
practices for the pursuit of well-defined interests of states, but also a practice 
constructing these states and their interests in the first place. In this way, foreign policy is 
introduced as a mechanism that reflects and contributes to changes in conceptions of state
' Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, Edward Said: The Paradox of Identity, (London: Routledge, 1999), 
124.
identity. As David Campbell argues, the identity of each state is performatively 
constituted by means of boundaries serving as demarcation lines that separate ‘inside’ 
from ‘outside’, ‘self from ‘other’, and ‘domestic’ from ‘foreign’.^  Thus, the politics of 
otherness, by inscribing boundaries between inside and outside, makes foreign policy 
possible? The thesis takes issue with those views that regard state identities as 
unproblematic and having prior existence to foreign policy. It is maintained that foreign 
policy is not the end result of an unproblematic state system or the relations among 
states, but is an ‘integral’ part of state construction and international relations.“*
Campbell views foreign policy as “boundary-producing practices central to the 
production and reproduction of identity in whose name it operates”, rather than “the 
external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities” .^  As such, he 
distinguishes between uppercase ‘Foreign Policy’ (the conventionally defined task of 
representing a country’s interests abroad), from lowercase ‘foreign policy’ (the process of 
constructing the broader context of identity and difference that informs Foreign Policy). 
Following Campbell’s analysis, this thesis views foreign policy not only as the “external 
orientation of preestablished states with secure identities”,^  but also as the practices 
through which the boundaries between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ are demarcated. 
Thus, ‘foreign policy’ is treated as the practices that construct the ‘inside’ and the 
‘outside, the ‘self and the ‘other’ in the first place, through practices o f inscribing
 ^David Campbell. Writing Security: United States Foreien Policy and the Politics of Identity. 2"‘* rev.ed., 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9.
 ^Campbell, Writing Security. 60.
Campbell, Writing Security. 60.
 ^ Campbell, Writing Security. 62.
exterior dangers, whereas ‘Foreign Policy’, conducted upon these representations, is 
viewed as the practices that maintain and secure state identity through diplomacy/
A number of sources may be utilized to examine the content of state identity. 
Thomas Banchoff argues that these sources include the constitutional rules governing 
foreign policy, “public opinion about a country’s international role’’ or widely adopted 
images about the state that take place in the “media and standardized textbooks’’.*  
Introducing various methods of investigating state identity as such, Banchoff limits the 
analysis to the discourse of national political elites. He states two advantages o f such a 
limitation. First, national political elites, as representatives of the state, are privileged in 
articulating their ideas on state identity. Banchoff assumes that these ideas are for the 
most part shared by the society.^ Second, analyzing political discourse is a beneficial way 
in studies that adopt a constructivist perspective to examine intersubjective beliefs. As 
Banchoff writes, “[s]tate identity pinpointed in political discourse is primarily a matter of 
public communication, not private conviction....For a given state identity to be of 
analytical use...it must be shared”. T h i s  thesis studies the shared aspects of Turkish 
foreign policy discourse during the Cold War to develop an account on the construction 
of Turkey’s Western identity. Looking at the foreign policy discourse on Turkey’s NATO 
membership, the social construction of Turkey’s Western identity is analyzed. Addressing
® Campbell, Writing Security. 68.
’ Campbell, Writing Security, 62.
* Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” European Journal of International 
Relations 5:3 (1999): 268-269.
 ^Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” 269.
Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” 269. Emphasis original.
the shared characteristics of these discourses, the thesis examines the role Turkish foreign 
policy representations played in mobilizing a particular view on Turkey’s identity.
Discourse analysis is a useful tool adopted in this thesis, as the goal here is to 
analyze particular representations of identities and social relations. Discourse is a specific 
way to talk about, understand and make meaning of the world.” When people talk and 
write, they represent a particular picture of what they think about their environment. 
They construct and organize their social reality through speech acts. To the extent that 
other people share their particular views about the world, these views become part of a 
collective meaning system. Senjoy Banerjee argues that, even if “not every discourse is 
associated with a corresponding practice....every practice has a corresponding 
discourse”.”  Drawing on this understanding, the great merit of discourse analysis is 
observed in its relation with a particular reality. This takes us to the idea that every 
practice in international relations has a corresponding discourse. The discourses deployed 
by policymakers for picturing particular aspects of world politics reveal the meaning 
system produced by foreign policy representations. What is meant by a meaning system is 
the social interaction and communication; i.e. speech acts of actors. It is the discursive 
practices of policymakers that create particular meanings in particular policy areas.
" Marianne Winther Jorgensen and Louise Phillips, Diskurs Analyse som Teori og Metode (Discourse 
Analysis as Theory and Method) (Roskilde Uniyersitetsforlag/Samfundslitteratur, 1999); cited in Trine 
Schreiber and Camilla Moring, “Codification of Knowledge Using Discorse Analysis,” 4. Paper 
presented at Nordic Conference on Information and Documentation, Reykjayik: Iceland, May 30-June 1, 
2001. Ayailable from World Wide Web http://www.bokis.is/iod2001/papers/Schreiber_paper.doc. 
Accessed on 15.04.2002.
Senjoy Banerjee, “The Cultural Logic of National Identity Formation: Contending Discourses in Late 
Colonial India,” in Culture and Foreign Policy. Valerie Hudson ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1<>97), 31.
Through mediation and learning processes, these meaning systems construct a special 
picture of the world, politics, identities and interests.
An analysis focusing on the discourse of the political elites allows us to 
understand the way pohcy goals are named and represented, how processes of interest 
formation are built up and policy agendas are outlined. A close examination of the 
discursive elements of foreign policy illustrates the uses of political rhetoric in Turkish 
foreign policy. Discourse analysis helps us to analyze the political representations of 
foreign policy elites and to understand the systems of signification associated with certain 
political choices. In this regard, discourse analysis is a useful tool in studying the 
construction of Turkey’s Western identity by way of the meanings ascribed to its NATO 
membership.
The necessary first step in the constructivist analysis of state identity is to specify 
the policy area that will be dealt with. As Banchoff maintains, since “states interact with 
many other states, participate in more than one international institution and have diverse 
historical experiences, they can possess multiple identities at any point in time”.’  ^For this 
reason, one must first address the area to be explored that corresponds to a particular 
identity of the state. This thesis specifies the area of analysis as the construction of 
Turkey’s Western identity by way of the discourse on NATO during the Cold War. It 
addresses the role played by NATO narratives in representing Turkey as a Western state.
Michael Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System,” 
International Studies Quarterly 37, 1993: 271-296, citing Banchoff, “German Identity and European 
Integration,” 269.
As BanchofFs argues, the leading elites “situate the state with respect to a given 
international constellation”.T h e y  describe their states’ place in the international arena in 
relation to other states and institutions. As such, they “reduce...the complexity of the 
international arena....[and ] define... ‘who we are’ in terms of ‘who and what we stand 
for’”.'^ In the same manner, Turkish foreign policy elites locate Turkey in a particular 
position in the world, conceptualize particular roles for the state, and thus define state 
identity. Building upon this understanding, the thesis examines the construction of 
Turkey’s state identity by way of the elite discourse taken from the journal Foreign 
Policv. Foreign Policy is employed to analyze discourses of NATO that represented 
Turkey’s membership to the organization as an indication that Turkey was a Western 
state.
Foreign Policv is chosen as the research material since it is a significant resource 
that publishes the views of policymakers on issues of Turkish foreign policy. It is a 
quarterly Journal published by the Foreign Policy Institute since 1971. As such, it is one 
of the oldest Journals on Turkish foreign policy. The main purpose of the Journal is stated 
as providing “objective analysis of foreign policy issues both to Turkish and foreign 
readers” .’^  Apart from publishing Foreign Policy, the Foreign Policy Institute has 
organized many seminars and conferences both in Turkey and abroad since 1976. 
Additionally, it published many books and manuscripts on foreign policy is s u e s .T h e
Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” 270.
Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” 270.
Seyfi Ta5lian, “Foreign Policy Institute, Its 25'*' Anniversary,” Bulletin for the 25"’ Anniversary of the 
Foreign Policv Institute.
Seyfi Ta§han, “Foreign Policy Institute.”
Institute works in collaboration with the Turkish Foundation for International Relations 
and Strategic Studies, the academia, media and government institutions. An important 
task of the Institute is stated as that of reflecting “European norms and acquis to the 
Turkish public opinion and in a similar way convey Turkey’s view points on common 
European issues to the world public’’.'* Thus, the Foreign Policy Institute expresses 
views on Turkish foreign policy through research, meetings and publications. The 
contributors of the journal include ministers of foreign affairs, academicians, diplomats, 
bureaucrats and members of the Turkish Armed Forces. Except for academics, these 
people come under the definition of foreign policy elites and have significant impact on 
the formulation and conduct of Turkish Foreign Policy. Thus, the journal Foreign Policy 
reflects the views o f scholarly, political, and—to an extent—military circles. This is why I 
have chosen to look at Foreign Policy to study the construction of Turkey’s Western 
identity with reference to its NATO membership.
By making use of excerpts from the journal’s articles, the thesis examines the 
foreign policy discourse of Turkey’s elite during the Cold War and how the cause of 
NATO membership was linked to Westernizing the country. In this way, this thesis 
addresses the process of the social construction of Turkey’s Western identity during the 
Cold War. The argument is that, entering NATO not merely indicated becoming a 
member of a military alliance. NATO membership was also used to represent Turkey as a 
member of the Western civilization, and thus drawing the boundaries between Turkey and 
the non-West.
Seyfi Ta§han, “Foreign Policy Institute.’
It is of great merit to analyze the articles of Foreign Policy to illustrate how foreign 
policy discourses of elites shape state identity. The journal provides an opportunity to 
illustrate how “social...analysis and political practice appear to permeate one another 
even if the analysts have no direct personal ties to the security apparatus of the state” . 
Making use of the journal Foreign Policy, it is possible to observe the representational 
force of policymakers’ definitions of state identity. In the final analysis, as Ido Oren 
argues, even when we regard the journal as purely an intellectual contribution to foreign 
policy,
the line between scholarship and politics becomes blurred to the extent 
that the ideas articulated by this scholarship (objective though the 
scholarship’s tone might be) are harmonious with the official foreign 
policy of the day
[T]he problem becomes more acute when the analyst explicitly uses 
ideas and concepts, which originated in proximity to the state.^”
Ido Oren maintains that scholars who analyze the ‘state sanctioned norms’ promoted by
official lines become engaged in the reproduction of these norms, which he ultimately
sees as a political act in itself.^’
Foreign Pohcv articles are employed in studying the social construction o f Turkish 
state identity in this thesis. ‘The ideas and concepts’ used by the authors are in close 
‘proximity’ to the official discourse. To summarize, using a constructivist model of 
identity formation and employing the articles of Foreign Policv. the analysis that follows 
focuses on the social construction of Turkey’s Western identity during the Cold War.
’ Ido Oren, “Is Culture Independent of National Security? How America’s National Security Concerns 
Shaped ‘Political Culture’ Research,” European Journal of International Relations 6:4 (2000): 546. 
Oren, “Is Culture Independent of National Security?” 565-566.
Oren, “Is Culture Independent of National Security?” 565.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The following three chapters present a 
theoretical framework to study identity formation. Chapter II introduces constructivist 
theory in International Relations (IR). Constructivism’s great merit for this thesis is that it 
transcends the one-way causal logic and the givenness of identity in essentialist accounts 
and that it emphasizes the importance of political processes in mobilizing interaction. 
Constructivism points to the mutually constitutive relationship between identity and 
interests and stresses the malleability of identity. As such, constructivism induces us to 
think these concepts through critical lenses. It takes issue with the arguments that treat 
identities and interests as ever-existing and unchanging phenomena, and observes the 
political motives behind their construction. Chapter II summarizes the basic tenets of 
constructivism. Next, the main issues and concepts relevant to the constructivist research 
agenda are analyzed. Among these are the role of intersubjective beliefs in mobilizing 
social action and concepts such as identity, interest, ideas, norms and transformation in 
international relations. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the strengths of 
constructivism in studying International Relations and its contributions to the discipline. 
The chapter also aims at providing the theoretical framework to study the social 
construction of identity.
Chapter III is based on a constructivist analysis of identity formation. IR theory has 
witnessed the return of the concepts of culture and identity in the aftermath of the Cold 
War.^^ The usage of the concept of identity in IR theory has become popular in the post-
Yosef Lapid, “Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory,” in The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3-5.
10
Cold War era both in mainstream and critical accounts. Treated as a ‘soft concept’ prior 
to the 1990s, identity became a major area of interest in IR theory after the Cold War. 
Chapter III presents constructivist conceptions of identity, which conceive identity as 
dynamic and transforming over time rather than static and complete. This chapter 
examines identity as a historically bound concept established within a particular field of 
social values and forms of behavior. It analyzes representations of identities to provide a 
comprehensive account of their social construction. Presenting a constructivist approach 
to identity. Chapter III provides a theoretical framework for studying identity in IR. The 
main argument is that no generalizable account of identity can be developed whereupon 
we can deduce objective and essential characteristics. Based on constructivist accounts of 
identity formation, this chapter presents an analysis of how cultural, social, gendered, 
political and other identities are sociaUy constructed through practices of representation. 
The chapter also examines the arguments on ‘difference’ in International Relations. The 
question of self/other is addressed in order to include a significant aspect of identity 
formation to the analysis. Finally, the social construction of boundaries between social 
groups and states as identity-bearing entities are analyzed.
Focusing on foreign policy as a boundary producing practice. Chapter IV adopts an 
alternative approach to study foreign policy. It looks at the construction of state identity 
by way of foreign policy representations. Following David Campbell, foreign policy is 
understood as a practice defining the object and subject positions in inter-state relations. 
As such, foreign policy becomes a practice constructing ‘we’ and ‘them’ and separating 
the ‘inside’ from the ‘outside’. Drawing on the understanding that states are identity­
bearing entities, this chapter introduces the significance of foreign policy practices in the
11
construction of state identity. It is argued that actor properties are not intrinsic to states, 
they are socially contingent; they depend on interaction. Chapter IV demonstrates how 
foreign policy and state identity can effectively be associated. Discourse analysis is 
adopted as a means for analyzing the role played by foreign policy representations in 
constructing particular identities.
Chapter V turns to look at how this theoretical construct could be utilized in 
analyzing the Turkish case. In particular it analyzes how Turkey’s Western identity was 
constructed through the discourse on NATO. The chapter uses foreign policy 
representations from the journal Foreign Policy to examine the construction o f Turkey’s 
Western identity. Focusing on representations of Turkey’s place in NATO, the ascription 
of fixed and stable characteristics to the state by means of dominant discursive practices 
is examined. As such. Chapter V demonstrates the roles played by policymakers’ 
representations in constructing Turkey’s Western identity. The aim is not to discover the 
‘essence’ of Turkey’s Western identity but to analyze the processes through which it was 
constructed through representations by the policymaking elite.
Chapter V maintains that Turkey’s state identity has been framed around a process 
of articulating ‘what it is not’ and concomitantly defining ‘what it is’. In other words, it is 
argued that foreign policy discourses made ‘foreign’ what was viewed irrelevant while 
incorporating what was deemed as constitutive of Turkey’s identity. Accordingly, this 
chapter looks at the construction of the Soviet Union as the ‘other’ of Turkey—the self. 
An alternative reading of Turkish foreign policy is presented in this chapter. It is argued 
that it is unclear whether Turkey has approached the West because it saw the Soviets as 
an ‘other’, or vice versa. It is argued that the Soviets might have been represented as the
12
‘other’ of Turkey in Turkey’s elites’ foreign policy discourse since Turkey wished to 
approach the West.
An alternative reading of the Turkish foreign policy texts also reveal the project of 
westernizing the country. Elite discourse establishes the border and defines the criteria of 
difference (inclusion/exclusion) between political identities. Following this argument, 
Chapter V suggests that the elite discourse on Turkey’s NATO membership demonstrates 
the efforts to turn Turkey into a ‘modem’, ‘democratic’ and ‘civilized’ Western state 
(inclusion), in the face of the ‘traditional’, ‘antidemocratic’ and ‘uncivilized’ states of the 
Eastern bloc (exlusion). It is these binary oppositions^^ that define the boundaries of 
political identities and political cultures. These binary oppositions create a common 
language among policymakers, mobilising common understandings and common 
definitions of identity.
Analyzing the texts on Turkey’s NATO membership during the Cold War is a 
beneficial way of examining the shared understandings of foreign policy elites. Elite 
discourse legitimizes the attitudes of states toward other states, and thus plays a 
significant role in the constmction of allies and enemies. Drawing upon this 
understanding, this thesis analyzes the social construction of ‘difference’ in Turkish
Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in the International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods,” European Journal of International Relations. 5: 2 (1999): 229.
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foreign policy and Turkey’s Western identity by looking at the meanings ascribed to its 
NATO membership.
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CHAPTER II: CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR THEORY
2.1 Introduction
Advancing a sociological perspective on world politics and offering alternative 
understandings to mainstream International Relations theories, constructivism has 
attracted growing attention among IR scholars in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Beginning from its introduction to IR theory by Nicholas Onuf in 1 9 8 9 , constructivism 
aroused deep scholarly inteirest, the reasons of which can be found in the alternative 
perspective brought by the theory in dealing with a number of central themes of IR 
theory. Among these themes are anarchy, balance of power, security dilemma, domestic 
politics and interest,^^ as well as relatively new concepts of IR such as identity, norms and 
culture.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce constructivist theory in International 
Relations. It presents the basic assumptions of the theory along with the prominent 
authors of the constructivist school in IR. Additionally, the main concepts and questions 
relevant to the constmctivist research agenda are examined. The objective is to present 
the strength of constructivism for the study of International Relations and the issues it 
seeks to explain.
Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, “Constructing Constructivism,” in 
International Relations in a Constructed World. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert 
eds. (Armonk.NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 4.
Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 
23:1 (1998): 172.
To introduce constructivism in IR theory, I begin by addressing briefly its origins 
in social theory and the basic arguments presented by constructivist scholars. Then, a 
brief literature review of prominent constructivist works in IR is introduced. It discusses 
the significance of meanings actors attach to circumstances in international politics. The 
following section examines the constructivist approach in comparison with the rationalist 
theories in IR. This section presents the dissatisfaction of constructivist literature with 
mainstream IR theories in dealing with world politics. It purports to show 
constructivism’s strengths in studying concepts such as identity, interests, ideas, norms 
and change in international relations. Additionally, it analyzes how identities and interests, 
as well as norms and other political practices in international politics are constructed by 
actors’ interpretations and interactions, rather than given by nature as rationalists argue. 
Thus, this chapter attempts to develop an understanding of constructivism in IR and its 
contributions to the discipline.
2.2 Origins and Definitions
Constructivism Ls a broad movement encircling many schools of thought, such as Kantian 
id ea lism ,th e  structuration theory of Anthony Giddens,^^ and the EngUsh school, which 
anticipated constmctivist concerns.^* The classical roots of constructivism in IR theory 
could be traced back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as its foundations
Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 855.
John Gerard Ruggie. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52:4 (1998): 862.
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were established by the views of the philosopher-sociologists of these periods. John 
Gerard Ruggie finds the origins of constructivism in Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, 
since both thinkers argued that what “connect, bond and bind individuals within social 
collectivities are shared ideational ties”, one of the core assumptions o f constructivism.^^ 
They both emphasized the mutual influence of material and ideational factors.
Alexander Wendt, a prominent constructivist IR scholar, introduces a highly 
developed account of constructivism. He argues that the core element selected by 
constructivism from social theory is its ‘idealism’, which means that structures o f human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material fo rc e s .W e n d t 
maintains that identities and interests of actors are constructed by shared ideas rather than 
given by nature.^' Thus, for Wendt, identities and interests do not stand ‘out there’ to be 
discovered, but are subject to construction and reconstruction by way of intersubjective 
understandings, i.e. the social interactions among actors.
Constructivists of various traditions^^ agree on the primary point that “humans see 
the world through perspectives, developed socially...[and that] reality is social and what 
we see. ‘out there’... is developed in interaction with others”. In this manner, 
constructivism deals with ‘human consciousness’,^ "^  the perspectives through which
A significant contribution of the English School has been its identifying elements of ‘global society’ 
and its structural and normative features shaping international politics. Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and 
Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), 58.
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 861.
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 1.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics , 1.
There are sociological, feminist, emancipatory and interpretive variants of constructivism as well as 
jurisprudential and genealogical approaches. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 880.
Palan, “A World of Their Making,” 580.
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 878-879.
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people make sense of their world and the extent to which these perspectives are shared by 
others. Accordingly, constructivism is an approach theorizing the world based on how 
human beings see the world, rather than explaining what is actually ‘out there’. In line 
with this understanding, reality is not viewed as objective but as constructed differently 
by different people. Constructivism examines the intersubjective dimension of human 
action that is directed towards lending significance to the world.
Constructivism should also be understood within the historical context it was
introduced to IR. The development of constructivist theories of International Relations is
associated with the end of the Cold War. For Stefano Guzzini, the dissolution of the
Eastern bloc and the end of the Cold War attests to the fact that
international structures are not objective....If...constructivism is basically 
about questioning the inevitability of the social status-quo, then the 
unexpected fall of the wall gave new legitimacy to such claims, in 
particular since the change seemed to have been effected by actors who 
have become self-consciously aware of the dilemma situation in which the 
Cold War had trapped them.^^
As Guzzini argues, the end of the Cold War made elear that international relations and 
international struetures, determined by human action and cognition through language and 
communication acts, are not fixed but ever changing as their production and reproduction 
is subject to ‘human practices’.V ie w e d  as such, the bipolar international structure of 
the Cold War years was not an inevitable and constant situation in world politics, but was 
subject to actors’ interpretations and representations of relations among them. Thus, the 
end of the Cold War came about not merely as a result of the changes in power relations.
Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” European Journal 
of International Relations 6:2 (2000): 154.
36 Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism,” 155.
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but also as a result of the policymakers’ evaluations of these relations. In this regard, 
constructivism is a valuable approach in questioning power relations that are for the most 
part regarded as natural consequences of the world order. Constructivism argues that 
power relations in international relations are not objective, natural and inevitable, but 
subject to intersubjective meanings and interpretation. Thus, constructivism is a useful 
approach to observe how various actors make meaning o f their environment and the 
material structures of international politics. Building upon these theoretical insights and 
the power of constructivism in explaining the issues under reference, this chapter 
proposes a constructivist framework for studying international relations.
2.3 Basic Assumptions
Before turning to the basic assumptions of constructivism in IR theory, it should be noted 
that there are various perspectives within constructivism in International Relations. 
However, the aim of this section is not to focus upon the different strands of 
constructivism and the debates among them, but to employ the core arguments of the 
theory to achieve a better understanding of a particular research problem. Stressing the 
basic assumptions of constructivism, this section tries to illuminate the common traits the 
theory is buUt on.
Broadly defined, constructivism deals with the interaction between material and 
social factors in international relations. One of the main contributions of constructivism to 
IR theory is the idea that much of the world we live in is our own making; that is to say.
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reality is socially constructed and shaped by our beliefs.^^ Drawing upon this argument, 
the object of study in International Relations is the social order, including the domestic 
and intersocietal spheres as well as the international and social spheres.^* According to 
constructivists, international reality is constructed through ideational as well as material 
means and these ideational factors have normative dimensions.^^ Constructivists state that 
collective as well as individual intentionality shape the world and that the meaning of 
ideational factors are contingent on time and place; an understanding that depicts reality 
as relational and situational.
In the same vein, Ruggie finds the most distinctive features of constructivism in 
the ontological realm. This leads him to the argument that “constructivism is not itself a 
theory of international relations, the way balance-of power theory is...but a theoretically 
informed approach to the study of international relations”.'*® In a similar way, Jeffrey 
Checkel argues that constructivism is
not a theory but an approach to social inquiry based on two assumptions:
1) The environment in which agents/states take action is social as well as 
material; and 2) this setting can provide agents/states with understandings 
of their interests (it can constitute them).'*'
Another constructivist account is presented by Emanuel Adler, who argues that “the 
manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1989); Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: 
Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: South Carolina Press, 1989).
Bill McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Uniyersity Press, 1999), 105.
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 879.
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 879-880.
'"Jeffrey Checkel, “The Constructiyist Turn in International Relations,” World Politics 50: 2 (1998): 
175-326.
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depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world”."*^ 
These arguments put emphasis on the social dimension of the interactions among 
individual actors or larger groupings of people and their shared understandings. It is these 
understandings that give meaning to the world. Thus, constructivism argues that beside 
the material aspects shaping our environment, the sociaMcognitive aspects framing our 
perspectives should be taken into consideration when studying International Relations.
The significance of ‘intersubjective meanings’ is introduced by Mark Neufeld as 
follows: “the practices in which human beings are engaged cannot be studied in isolation 
from the ‘web of meaning’ which is...constitutive of those practices, even as it is 
embedded in and instantiated through those some practices’’.'*^  The close link between 
ideas and practice is further highlighted by Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, who hold that 
ideas are ‘symbolic technologies’ which are “most simply, intersubjective systems of 
representations and representation-producing practices”.'*'* Then, according to 
constructivists, ideas are intersubjectively constituted and are themselves constitutive of 
social reality.
Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics” European Journal of 
International Relations 3:3(1997): 322.
Mark A. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 76. Neufeld defines ‘intersubjective meanings’ as “the product of the collective 
.self-interpretations and self-definitions of human communities”. Neufeld, The Restructuring of 
International Relations Theory, 77.
Mark Laffey and Julta Weldes, “ Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of 
International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 3:2 (1997): 209.
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2.4 Constructivism versus Rationalism
In order to present a better account of constructivism in IR, it should be examined in 
comparison with rationalist approaches and with reference to the issues it attempts to 
apprehend. Constructivism in International Relations addresses many of the issues 
examined by mainstream approaches— such as balance of power, security dilemma, 
neoliberal cooperation and democratic peace'*^—though from a different perspective. 
Constructivism also deals with issues that rationalist theories discount, ignore, or simply 
cannot explain within their characteristic ontology and epistemology, including issues 
such as identity, interest, ideas, norms and change in international relations. Analyzing the 
intersubjective dimensions o f social action and social order, and dealing with politics in 
space and time dimensions, constructivism seeks to overcome the shortcomings o f 
mainstream approaches in studying the interests and identities of actors.
Constructivists criticize rationalists for being extremely materialist and agent­
centric. Constructivists see neither agency nor structure as primary. They maintain the 
mutual constitutiveness o f structures and agents. As Thomas Risse argues, constructivism 
is an approach taking issue with both individualistic approaches giving priority to agents 
and those privileging structural constraints in constructing the social environment. 
Instead, he holds that social constructivism “cannot be reduced to or collapsed 
into...[agents or structures]” .'*^
For a constructivist analysis of these is.sues see Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism,” 186-192. 
Thomas Risse, “ ‘Let’s Argue!’:Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 
54:1 (2000): 5
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According to mainstream IR theory, identities and interests are given. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, takes issue with mainstream approaches, which take 
identities and interests for granted. Constmctivists argue that identities and interests do 
not stand ‘out there’ to be discovered, but are subject to construction and reconstruction 
by way of intersubjective understandings. They maintain that identities and interests result 
from social interaction among actors. Additionally, constructivism deals with 
international politics as a contingent practice transforming over time. As such, 
international politics is viewed to be subject to change through the policymaking process.
Since its foundation, the discipline of International Relations has witnessed a 
number of debates; between idealism and realism, between traditionalism and 
behaviouralism, between state-centric and transnationaUst approaches, and between the 
three paradigms of Realism, Liberalism and Marxism.'*^ John Hobson presents the recent 
debate as one between rationalism (including the neorealist and neoliberal approaches) 
and reflectivism (including constructivism).'** Hobson argues that the rise of 
constructivism has reshaped the ‘trichotomy’ among realism, liberalism/pluralism and
'*^  See for the debate between Realism and Liberalism Charles Kegley, ed., Controversies in International 
Relations Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), David Baldwin, ed.. Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and James E. 
Dougherty, Robert L. Jr. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive 
Survey (Longman, 2000); for the debate between Traditionalism and Behavioralism Morton Kaplan, 
“Variants on six models of the international system,” in James Rosenau ed.. International Politics and 
Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969) and Kaplan, ‘The New 
Great Debate: Traditionalism Vs. Science in International Relations,” World Politics 19 (1966); for the 
debate between Realism, Liberalism and Marxism Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye jr.. Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977).
Steve Smith, ‘The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?” British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 2:3 (2000): 376.
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Marxist structuralism into a ‘dichotomy’, meaning that the recent debate is between
49rationalism and constructivism.
Adler sees constructivism as an attempt to ‘seize the middle ground’ between 
rationalism and reflectivism. He considers constructivism as standing at the intersection 
of the two major debates within the social sciences, that between materialism and 
idealism, and that between agency-based and structure-based models of the world.^° 
Whether constructivism was introduced to the discipline to replace mainstream IR 
theories or as an alternative, it is clear that scholarly interest in constructivism has grown 
as the limits of conventional theories became evident. As Ruggie puts it, constructivism 
has contributed to IR by widening the theoretical borders of the field, taking actor 
identities and interests not for granted but problematizing them, and comprehending “the 
intersubjective bases of social action and social order in the analyses”. '^ Accordingly, in 
addition to introducing new areas of inquiry to International Relations, constructivism has 
provided a new perspective to existing approaches. In order to develop a better account 
of constructivism in IR, in the following part it will be examined in comparison with 
rationalist approaches and with reference to the issues— i^dentity, interest, ideas, norms 
and change in international relations— it attempts to apprehend.
49 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 145.
Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” 323-326.
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 863.
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Constructivists take issue with the rationalist claim that state interests and identities are 
fixed, and hold that they are bound to change. According to Hobson, rationalists regard 
IR as the product of agents who are oriented with ‘instrumental rationality’, which means 
that states are rationally power and utility maximizing agents.^^ Rationalists see state 
interests as exogenously produced prior to social interaction. Neorealism and 
neoliberalism, two major IR paradigms, rest on these foundations and consider state 
preferences as unproblematic and “readily deducible from the objective characteristics 
and conditions of states”.C onstructiv ists , on the other hand, hold that states do not a 
priori know what their interests are.^"' The assumption that ‘states know what they want’ 
and that preferences are inherent in states or contingent on material conditions is viewed 
as misleading by constructivists. As Martha Finnemore maintains, state preferences are 
malleable and are shaped through processes of social learning and imitation.^^
In the same vein, Hobson holds that “states are constrained by social normative 
structures, through which the identities of states are constructed”.^  ^ These identities, in 
turn, define states’ interests, leading to the formation of state policy. Thus, “interests and 
identities are informed by norms which guide actors (states) along certain socially 
prescribed channels of ‘appropriate behaviour’”.^ ’ In other words, constructivists
2.4.1 Identity and Interests
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Hobson, The State and International Relations, 145-146.
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1996),
Hobson, The State and International Relations ,146.
Finneinore, National Interests in International Society, 11.
’ Hobson, The State and International Relations ,146.
Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146.
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problematize ‘identity’ (which rationalists fail to do) and argue that identities change in 
line with normative structural changes, which ultimately change interests as well.
Ruggie presents a comparative account of constructivism, distinguishing it from 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. He criticizes those ‘neo-utilitarianist’ 
approaches that do not answer the basic question of how states acquire their identities 
and interests. He argues that neo-utilitarianism fails to explain the role of normative 
factors and states’ identities in shaping their interests and behaviors. He criticizes neo­
utilitarian approaches’ dealing merely with the circumstances that states find themselves 
constrained with, but not the ‘making’ of these circumstances. Adopting a constructivist 
perspective, he asserts that these circumstances are not given (they are not what states 
find themselves in) but are deliberately created through social interaction. In other words, 
for Ruggie, the circumstances constraining states are created through the meanings 
attached to them in processes of understanding, interpretation, and acting upon them.^^
Wendt also takes issue with neorealist and neoUberal theories of IR since they 
treat identities and interests of agents as exogenously given.*’® Rather, he gives 
prominence to an “intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests 
are endogenous to interaction”.*’  ^ He criticizes the prunordialist logic of mainstream 
theories in dealing with identity and interests. Further, he holds that state identities and
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?”862-864. 
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?”877.
60 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46:2 (1993): 391.
Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it,” 394.
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interests are malleable to transformation rather than being static and stable.^^ Thus, 
Wendt argues that the structures within which action takes place are endogenous to 
process and that intersubjective meanings will change as practices of interaction change. 
As to the relationship’ between identities and interests, Wendt presents a constructivist 
account in his book:
[IJnterests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it 
wants untU it knows who it is.... Identities may themselves be chosen in 
light of interests, as some rationalists have argued, but those interests 
themselves presuppose still deeper identities...[because] without 
interests identities have no motivational force, [and] without identities
interests have no direction 63
Even if Wendt seems to give ontological primacy to identities over interests, in the final 
analysis, he regards them as having ‘complementary explanatory roles’,*''* which means 
that identities and interests are mutually constitutive.
What we can infer from these constructivist accounts is that, identities and 
interests are not constant, given and unchanging, but subject to change in particular 
circumstances. Since it is the social interactions and intersubjective meanings that lend 
significance to identities and interests, we must analyze them within the framework of the 
meaning system they are created and recreated. Constructivism passes beyond a fixed, 
unchanging and inevitable vision of the world that mainstream theories develop to one 
that is socially constructed. It contributes to the discipline by the way it deals with 
identity and interest related issues; taking them as ever-changing entities that are 
constructed by the shared understandings of actors.
64
Wendt, “Anarchy is What vStates Make of it,” 394. 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 231. 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 231.
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Another difference between constructivist and rationalist approaches is the way they deal 
with ideas and norms. Constructivism treats the relationship between ideas and material 
factors in a way that is completely different from that of rationalists, who see ideas as 
secondary to material causes.
Ruggie states the critical differences between constructivist and neo-utilitarian
approaches as being related more with philosophical issues such as ideas than empirical
ones.^^ He uses Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s rationalist definition of ideas—
beliefs held by individuals—to mark this difference. He challenges the reductionism and
methodological individualism of rationalism and argues that constructivism deals with
‘intersubjective beliefs’. He makes use of John Searle’s concept ‘collective intentionality’
to explain that ideas are social as well as individual facts, and that ‘collective
consciousness’ is what creates meaning in the international realm.*’*’ In order to make his
argument more clear, he employs the concept ‘sovereignty’. He writes:
The mutual recognition of sovereignty...is a precondition for the 
normal functioning of a system of sovereign states....[which] exists 
only within a framework of shared meaning that recognizes it to be
67valid— that is, by virtue of collective intentionality.
Ruggie points out to the social dimension of ideas having the impact of creating
intersubjective frameworks in world politics.
2.4.2 Ideas, Norms and Transformation
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 869. 
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?”869-870. 
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?”870.
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With regard to the issue of norms, contrary to the rationalist view that ‘states 
exactly know what their interests are’, constructivists maintain that states’ behaviors and 
preferences are circumscribed by social normative structures.*’* For rationalists, norms are 
either determined by the interests of states or are granted by a ‘relative autonomy’ This 
is another reductionist understanding which treats norms as epiphenomenal, functional 
vehicles that realize the interests of states. It holds that even if “norms constrain states in 
the short run, they are ultimately created by states and for states to maximize their long- 
run power interests”.^ ** Contrary to this rationalist perspective, constructivists attach to 
norms a more independent role in shaping the interests and identities of power actors.^’ 
Constructivism regards norms as having constitutive characteristics, rather than just 
regulating the conduct of policy.
The distinction between constitutive and regulative norms deserves additional 
emphasis in explaining the differences between rationalist theories and constructivism. 
Hobson states that neoliberal institutionalism sees norms as only regulating state 
behavior, rather than constituting it.^  ^ According to this argument, neoliberal 
institutionalists take state preferences as given and constant, thus norms can only adjust 
policies for the accurate and proper implementation of interests. For constructivists, on
72
Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146. 
Hobson, The State and International Relations. 146-147. 
' Hobson, The State and Inlernational Relations. 146-147. 
Hobson, The State and International Relations. 147. 
Hobson, The State and International Relations, 147.
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the other hand, norms have a constitutive effect that do not simply regulate behavior, but 
“help to constitute the very actors.. .whose conduct they seek to regulate” .’^
Like Hobson, Ruggie states that neo-utUitarianism lacks any concept of 
constitutive rules.^^ He notes that,
[Neo-utilitarianism’s] universe of discourse consists' entirely of 
antecedently existing actors and their behaviour, and its project is to 
explain the character and efficacy of regulative rules in coordinating 
them....[thus, neo-utilitarian accounts] are capable of explaining the 
origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of 
international relations....All are assumed to exist already or are 
misspecified.^^
In the same manner with Hobson’s argument, Ruggie holds that constitutive rules are the 
institutional basis for social life and international politics. As he says, “[s]ome constitutive 
rules, like exclusive territoriality, are so deeply sedimented or reified that actors no longer 
think of them as rules at aU”.’  ^For him, geographical representations of the world are not 
material ‘facts’ that are readily given by nature, but are intersubjective conceptualizations 
of humans. To develop his point, Ruggie argues that ‘exclusive territoriality’ is not just “a 
brute physical act such as seizing a piece of land” and designating where one territory 
ends and another begins.’’ Rather, it is a social practice that depends on collective 
intentionally, namely the collectively shared meanings attached to this 
conceptualization.’* As Hobson notes, the core difference between rationalism and 
constructivism has to do with the “degree of autonomy [these] theories ascribe to
73
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norms”7^ In the final analysis, constructivism grants much higher levels of autonomy to 
norms (or rules) and ideas than rationalist theories.
A further issue constructivists attempt to explain is transformation in international 
relations. They argue that neo-utilitarian models fail to explain systemic transformation in 
world politics. Ruggie states that neorealists have two arguments on transformation. The 
first argument asserts that no theory of transformation is necessary, since the nature of 
international politics is stable; we witness only repetitions in states’ behaviors and 
preferences. The second neorealist argument maintains that there is no need for a theory 
of transformation since decisive transformations are not experienced in the world today.®*^  
One of constructivism’s strengths is observed here. Contrary to these neorealist 
arguments, constructivists argue that the dynamic nature of social construction allows for 
accounts of transformation in the international system. Constructivists, through 
“historicizing the concept of structure in international politics, that is to say, rescuing it 
from being treated as the reified residue left behind by long-ceased historical processes”,*' 
have added a new dimension to IR theory. The novelty of the constructivist project is 
that, it treats structures as ever-changing entities, being contingent on time, space and 
social practices, thus rendering change possible.
Neorealist theory, on the other hand, provides no explanation for change in 
international relations. Rey Kaslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil develop a constructivist
Hobson, The State and International Relations. 146.
To better elaborate this point, Ruggie presents a neorealist argument that there is no transformative 
difference between Medieval Europe and the modern system of states since “the conflict groups, striving 
for advantage, forging alliances, and using force to settle disputes existed in both and were not visibly
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account on systemic change. For the authors, it is misleading to conceive international 
politics as consisting of ‘immutable’ power structures that are established on 
“distributions of tangible resources”. Rather, they regard these structures as human 
constructions that are established through ‘routinized practices’, which are regulated by 
norms.*"* Thus, change in these systems is possible due to changes in routinized behavior 
and norms, rather than a change in material conditions and power distributions.*^ For 
Kaslowski and Kratochwil, what induces change in international politics is the 
transformation in shared understandings. They argue that one must focus on the changes 
in routinized practices and the shared meaning system in order to provide an account of 
change.
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2.5 Conclusion
Constructivism develops a sociological account of International Relations and introduces 
an alternative perspective to mainstream theories. Developing a theory that focuses on 
the social, ideational and intersubjective aspects of international politics, it brings a new 
dimension to the discipline. Constructivism views identities and interests, as well as 
institutions and structures as the product of meaningful interaction, interpretation and 
practice. It takes issue with the traditional accounts that take identities and interests as 
fixed, given and stable entities. Instead, constructivism holds that they are shaped through
affected by whatever common norms Medieval Christendom may have embodied.” Ruggie, “What Makes 
the World Hang Together?” 874.
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 875.
Rey Kaslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet 
Empire’s Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48:2 (1994): 215.
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processes o f social interaction that are bound to change. Constructivism deals with the 
sociological construction of subjects and objects and the “sociohistorical conditions under 
which language, meaning and social power interact”.**^ In the final analysis, 
constructivists’ basic concern is to uncover the interaction between social and material 
elements of domestic and international politics, which constitute the rules structuring 
international order and lead to systemic change.
An additional reason to take constructivism seriously in IR theory is demonstrated 
by Waever, who argues that: “[constructivism] has a large, almost unlimited potential for 
integrating other theories within it: all kind of structures, units or mechanisms can be 
tolerated as long as they are seen as ‘socially constructed’”.*^  Indeed, constructivism has 
widened the horizons of IR theory by bringing social theory into international relations, 
and making possible the shift fi'om an individualist, agent-centered approach to a more 
structural understanding of IR, encompassing ideational as well as material factors. 
Consequently, constructivism’s explanatory power stems from the fact that it sees the 
reality of history, politics and identity to be generated within a particular cultural 
environment, and that things could be otherwise.
To consider constructivist approaches in more detail, it should be analyzed in 
association with the concept of identity; one of the central issues constmctivism tries to 
apprehend. This not only has the benefit of situating this thesis within a broader context
Kaslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics,” 222,223.
Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smith, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and 
Constructivism,” in International Relations : Critical Concepts in Political Science Andrew Linklater ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 1792.
Ole Waever, “Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons Instead of Paradigms,” in The 
Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making? Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever eds. 
(London: Routlcdge, 1997), 25.
33
in International Relations. It also points to a key element this thesis discusses, namely the 
concept of identity, the concept’s application to states, and its association with foreign 
policy practices. These issues are examined in detail in the following chapters. The effort 
to explore the social construction of identity and to employ it as an analytical concept in 
studies of foreign policy in general and in Turkish foreign policy in particular has the 
potential to open new horizons in the discipline of IR.
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CHAPTER III: IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
3.1 Introduction
IR theory, as well as social theory in general, has witnessed the ‘return’ of culture and 
identity in the aftermath of the Cold War.** The growing usage of the concept identity 
has become evident in post-Cold War IR theorizing both in mainstream approaches— that 
used to marginalize these concepts— and in critical accounts. Although identity was 
regarded as a “soft concept suitable for novelists and sociologists” prior to the 1990s, it 
became a major area of interest for those studying international politics after the Cold 
War. Yosef Lapid suggests two reasons for this transition.^*’ The first is the global 
changes, namely the separatist nationalist movements that demanded scholarly 
explanations based on cultural accounts. The second reason is the changes experienced 
within the IR community, which extended the theoretical and empirical horizons of its 
students.
Identity is not a newly discovered ‘fact’ about international relations, but a 
concept that has always been present in world politics. Lapid defines the rising interest in 
culture and identity after the end of the Cold War as a ‘return’ in IR theory since it is not
Yosef Lapid, “Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory,” in The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3-5.
Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Uniyersity Press, 1999), 69.
the first time these concepts are used in the discipline.^' For him, there have always been 
place for such concepts, however through different perspectives. Lapid maintains that 
culture and identity are not newly discovered facts about international politics, but are 
ever-existing phenomena that are viewed and studied in a new way. The problem at hand 
this time is the ‘tension’ between the essentialist views of identity—treating the concept 
as self-evident and unproblematic—and the critical approaches that view identity as 
‘constructed’, ‘contested’, ‘polymorphic’, and ‘interactive’
Drawing upon the sentence “[w]e see things not as they are, but as we are”^^  (an 
account pointing to the differences between positivist and post-positivist perspectives) 
this chapter is based on a constmctivist conception of identity, which assumes that 
identity should be conceived as dynamic and transforming over time rather than static 
and complete. This chapter deals with the problem of identity as a historically bound 
concept established within a particular field of social values and forms of behavior. The 
major aim is to present identities as powerful and constitutive forces in world politics 
that are socially constructed. How cultural, social, gendered, political and other 
identities are formed and accommodated is the underlying theme of the chapter. It 
focuses on the representations of identities to provide a comprehensive account of their 
social construction. Offering a constructivist approach to identity, this chapter provides 
a theoretical framework for studying identity in IR.
90 Lapid, “Culture’s Ship,” 4.
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The chapter begins by addressing the essentialist and constructivist perspectives 
of identity formation. It purports to present the major differences between the two 
approaches on identity. In the following section, constructivist accounts of identity are 
introduced. This section goes beyond the mainstream accounts of identity, which 
attribute any identity essential qualities and take them for granted. It focuses on four 
kinds of identity—personal, type, role and collective— introduced by Alexander Wendt, 
as they provide a comprehensive account of many aspects of identity formation. This 
section consists of three parts. First, the question of self/other is addressed as a useful 
way to study the social construction of identities. Second, the social construction of 
boundaries between social groups is explored. Finally, building upon the argument that 
states are identity-bearing entities, the concept of state identity is examined.
3.2 Main Approaches to Identity Formation in IR: Essentialism versus 
Constructivism
Identity can take many forms: racial, ethnic, class, gender, religious, age, income, societal 
and so on. It has been for the most part ethnic or racial identity that the discipline of 
International Relations has dealt with. Since culture and identity are broad and complex 
concepts, it will be difficult to handle the problems of collective and state identity without 
specifying what is meant by identity. Considering that studying identity is a 
multidisciplinary effort and that there is “no one methodology for cultural studies”,^ '’ 
diverse perspectives of different scholars may have explanatory power at different
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junctures. To this end, prominent constructivist scholars’ arguments on identity 
construction are presented below.
Alexander Wendt argues that “[ijdentities refer to who or what actors For
him, “to have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given 
situation”.^ *’ To elaborate on what is meant by identity one should focus on the main 
approaches to identity formation in International Relations. Analyzing identity formation 
with reference to the differences between essentiaHst and constructivist approaches is a 
fruitful way of understanding the constructivist account of identity.
Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe state that the three main paradigms of 
International Relations—Realism, Pluralism and Structuralism/Globalism— are
“theoretically and epistemologically [too] constrained” to deal with questions of 
id e n tity .A s  they note, “realists are far too committed to states and military-political 
affairs; pluralists are far too committed to the empirical nature of transnational processes; 
structuraUsts/globalists are far too committed to economics and classes” *^ to handle 
issues of identity. The problem with these paradigms is that they view the world as 
‘distinct bits of reality’ and as unproblematic.^^
Traditional approaches treat theory as a tool “either to explain or to understand 
these pieces of reality, with the added possibility of predicting future international
R.L. Jepperson and A. Swindler, “What Properties of Culture Should We Measure,” Poetics 22:368 
(1994): 368, cited in Lapid, “Culture’s Ship,” 11.
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 231. Emphasis original.
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events”.''^ Such an understanding leads the realist/positivist perspective to take some 
events as ‘central’ and ‘important’, whereas seeing others as ‘specific’, ‘local’ or 
‘irrelevant’. Identity has been treated as the latter in studies of International Relations. 
Post-positivist theories on the other hand, consider identity as one of the central issues of 
IR.
In view of the perspective presented above, a basic distinction regarding different 
approaches to identity formation can be made between essentialist and constructivist 
accounts. Briefly, essentialists view identities as flowing from a cultural raw material and 
as fixed. On the contrary, constructivists dispute this essentialist linkage and hold that 
identities are formed through a political process involving the manipulation of cultural 
symbols.'®'
According to the essentialist approach, the basis of an identity is its ethnic core 
that is given by cultural heritage. Although the degree to which essentialist perspectives 
adopt primordial assumptions may vary, all share the basic idea that identity formation is 
mobilized chiefly by ‘cultural background variables’,'®^  and that identities remain static 
through time. The constructivist account, on the other hand, is explained by Lars-Erik 
Cederman as follows:
Since cultural systems are inherently multidimensional, history does not 
deliver ready-made packages such as ethnic cores. Instead, it is up to 
the political activist to select the ethnic cleavages to be mobilized or
suppressed. 103
99 Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 297.
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Accordingly, a particular identity is viewed as a matter of political choice, rather than a 
fixed entity standing ‘out-there’ waiting to be illuminated. The more a chosen identity is 
articulated and thus circulated around political circles, the more viable it becomes.“^
Using constructivist methods, David Campbell depicts identity as an “inescapable 
dimension of being”. H e  takes issue with the e,ssentialist accounts of identity, viewing it 
as being fixed by nature, and having ahistoric qualities. He criticizes the views ascribing 
an intrinsic dimension to identity such as those that view democracy as an intrinsic 
characteristic of the United S ta te s .C am p b e ll considers this argument as reductionist, 
for it regards particular features of states as inherent, and sees a highly contestable 
concept such as democracy as an intrinsic quality.
To sum up, constructivists take issue with the one-way causal logic and the 
givenness of identity in essentialist accounts. Instead, they emphasize the importance of 
political processes in mobilizing identities, point to the mutual relationship between 
identity and interests and stress the malleability of identity. In this way, constructivism 
induces us to think these concepts of international politics through critical lenses, not to 
treat them as ever-existing and unchanging phenomena, but to observe the political 
motives behind their construction.
'“^ According to— what Cederman calls— ‘instrumentalist constructivism’, the causal relationship 
adopted in the essentialist approach follows just the opposite route. This is to say, the point of departure 
for instrumentalist constructivists is the political motives inducing identity formation, rather than 
cultural traits. Regarding culture as a side effect of the process, constructivists emphasize the autonomy 
of political factors. Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 11-12.
David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 2'"^ rev.ed. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9.
An idea presented in Ronald L.Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J.Katzenstein, “Norms,
Identity, and Culture in National Security” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics. Peter J.Katzenstein ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 59.
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3.3 Constructivist Accounts of Identity
It would be appropriate to begin with Alexander Wendt to present the constructivist 
approaches to identity formation. Wendt provides a highly developed account of the 
social construction of identities in his book Social Theory of International Politics. H e  
argues that in the philosophical sense “an identity is whatever makes a thing what it is”, 
and that “it [is]...a property of international actors that generates motivational and 
behavioral dispositions”. W e n d t  argues that identities are not constituted only through 
internal dynamics, namely the ‘self-understandings’ of actors. If an identity is said to have 
an intersubjective quality, then other actors’ representations of the actor in question 
should also be taken into consideration.^That is, the identity of any actor is meaningful 
only if others also share it. Wendt identities four kinds of identity through which he 
categorizes particular social groups and characteristics: Personal or corporate, type, role 
and collective.
1. Personal—or in organizations corporate— i^dentities are identities ascribed 
to agents, and thus to states. A personal or corporate identity has two major 
characteristics, the material quality (the body for human beings and territory for states) 
and consciousness, or memory.“ ' In the case of states, the latter corresponds to the 
collective identity of individuals, who have a ‘joint narrative of themselves’ as members
Campbell, Writing Security, 279.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. See especially 224-233 and 318-369.
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of a group that leads to the formation of a corporate identity."^ For Wendt, “[t]he state is 
a group-Self, capable of group-level cognition”.“  ^ He views personal corporate identity 
as possessing certain essential properties, which are “constitutionally exogenous to
114Otherness”.
This essentialist claim is highly problematic, since Wendt aims at developing a 
constructivist account of identity. Making a one to one correspondence with the human 
body and the state ‘body’, and arguing that the existence of a corporate identity is 
‘exogenous to Otherness’, Wendt views states as ‘self-organizing’ actors having 
existence independent of other states. However, if the narratives and memories of 
individuals are seen as the constitutive effect behind the corporate identity o f a state, than 
the content and constitutive effects of such narratives on identity should also be 
problematized. In the final analysis, narratives are the tales of victory and glory for 
nations who have defeated ‘other’ nations. Although Wendt treats identity as a central 
concept of his analysis, his way of conceptualizing identity by ascribing to it essentialist 
qualities endangers his constructivism.
2. Type Identity is a social category referring to the commonalities between 
actors in “appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills.. .knowledge, opinions, 
experience...and so on”.*'  ^ An important feature of a type identity is its social content 
that is established by ‘formal membership rules’."*’ These rules change culturally and
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 225. 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 225. 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 225. 
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historically, define the type identity and “orient the behavior of Others toward it” .*’’ T}pe 
identities are viewed as ‘intrinsic’ to actors, individual possessions that are transformed 
into ‘social types’ by including others in their constitution. Thus, Wendt attributes the 
‘self-organizing’ and essential qualities of personal and corporate identities to type 
identities as well.
3. Role Identities, unlike type identities, do not have intrinsic qualities and are 
formed in relation to others."* Role identities can only be acquired through social 
interaction “by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms 
toward others possessing relevant counter-identities” . F o r  Wendt, what defines a role 
is the interdependence (or intimacy) between the self and the other. “When intimacy is 
high.. .role identities might not be just a matter of choice that can be easily discorded, but 
positions forced on actors by the representations of significant others”.'"*^  Accordingly, a 
state encounters a structural restraint of abandoning its role, since the other resists to see 
the self in another identity.
Making use of Peter Berger’s views, Ken Booth focuses on role theory as well, 
since he sees it as central to questions about identity. Berger defines a role as “a typified 
response to a typical expectation”.'^’ Booth interprets this formulation as such: “society 
provides the script, individuals slip into assigned roles, and the social play proceeds as
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 226.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 227.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Polities. 227.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 228.
Peter L.Berger, Invitation to Soeiology: A humanistic Perspective (Harinondsworth: Pelican Books, 
1966), 140, cited in Booth, “Security and Self,” 88.
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planned as long as everybody plays his or her appropriate part”.'^  ^ In this way, the roles 
of an actor are shaped by the expectations of other actors, which in turn form and 
regulate patterns of action. As to the role-identity nexus. Booth states that every role has 
an identity; some of which “are trivial and temporary, others are not.” ‘^  ^ Drawing on this 
idea. Booth finds it difficult to change identity, since such a change would lead to the loss 
of ‘identity-bearing bonuses’ acquired through the roles that identity plays.
4. Collective Identity, for Wendt, is the last phase in the mutually constitutive 
relationship between self and other, which is defined as ‘identification’. Identification is a 
cognitive process in which the self is defined with the other. In this way, the boundaries 
of identification are extended where the self is defined not in opposition to, but along 
with the other. Identifying the self in the same terms with the other leads to the 
construction of a collective identity.
Wendt also introduces the impact of role and type identities in the constitution of 
collective identities. Like role identity, collective identity “incorporates the Other into the 
Self’, but different from role identity, collective identity transforms this group into a 
single i d e n t i ty .A n d  tike type identities, a collective identity contains shared features of 
the self and the o t h e r . I n  other words, a collective identity is a combination of role and 
type identities, through which actors see the ‘welfare’ of the other together with its own.
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and thus “calculate their interests in the group”. A l t h o u g h  Wendt’s four types o f 
identity have certain shortcomings as presented above, they provide us with a useful 
guide to understand different aspects of identity formation. Wendt’s constructivist 
account on the formation of role and collective identities is of great merit in the analyses 
presented in the following chapters.
3.3.1 The Question of Self/Other
Exarnining the self-other nexus is an important component of constructivist research on 
identity, since social categories are defined in contrast to one another; “we are what we 
are because they are not what we are”.'^  ^ The boundaries between the ‘self and the 
‘other’ or ‘we’ and ‘them’ are drawn following a differentiation between the ‘insiders’ 
and the ‘outsiders’. As it is stated in social psychology, “[t]he insiders in the we-group 
are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, an industry, to each other”, whereas all
130others, with reference to the seifs measures, are downgraded.
Wendt assumes two actors, ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, to explain the mutual interaction 
process between self and other in identity formation. Ego and Alter are assumed to be 
actors present in a world without shared ideas and meeting in the ‘First Encounter’, 
which means they have no prior contact.'^' In the first encounter. Ego and Alter have 
freedom to choose among various representations of self, which is called ‘role taking’. In
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 229.
Marilynn B.Brewer and William D.Crano, Social Psychology (Minneapolis: West Publishing 
Company, 1994), 449. Emphasis original.
Brewer and Crano, Social Psychology, 44.
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this assumption, the particular ‘role identity’ of Ego is formed in relation to Alter’s 
‘counter-role’.’^  ^ In the case that representations of Ego are shared by Alter, the First 
Encounter phase is transcended through the interaction process and shared knowledge. 
From this point on, the relationship between Alter and Ego is one of a ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’ :
[B]y treating the other as if he is supposed to respond in a certain way.
Alter and Ego wUl eventually learn shared ideas that generate those 
responses, and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they 
will tend to reproduce them in subsequent interactions.’^ '’
In other words, as Alter and Ego come to shaie the ideas about who they are, they adapt
to the representations of self and other. As they gather new information about each other,
they will revise their existing definitions of the situation.
Wendt also notes that Ego’s ideas about Alter are not only the perceptions of 
Ego, “but actively and on-goingly constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego”.'^  ^
Accordingly, role identities are not just the meanings accorded by actors to themselves, 
but are also identities that become realized through the interaction process between self 
and other and eventually the other’s acceptance of the selPs role-identity. It is the shared 
understandings developed through social contact that constitutes identity and makes it 
meaningful.
Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney criticize Wendt’s ‘Alter/Ego’ model. They 
argue that Wendt’s approach produces no account of actors prior to their interaction with 
others. They take issue with the argument that “states do not have a conception of self
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 329. 
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and other...apart from or prior to interaction” '^^  (an idea presented above in the Ego- 
Alter relationship). For InayatuUah and Blaney, Wendt ignores the “motivations, ideas, 
purposes, intentions, and images actors bring to contact”.'^’ In contrast to Wendt, 
InayatuUah and Blaney argue that actors are not ‘blank states’ having no idea of the other 
prior to contact, but are oriented towards acting in particular ways before interaction.'^® 
By way of illustration, Inayatullah and Blaney make use of Tzvetan Todorov’s 
study about the ‘conquest’ of America. According to Todorov, before his actual contact 
with Americans, Colombus had a particular notion of them gained through what he read 
in the Bible and other texts. Drawing upon this argument, Inayatuliah and Blaney argue 
that states, as well as other actors, are driven by their particular ideas and preconceptions 
in their contact with other states. As Todorov states “the other is discovered but never 
seen”.'®^  This means that even before actual contact, states are inclined to behave in 
particular ways toward the ‘others’.
Bill McSweeney’s account seems relevant at this juncture. He argues that, 
differentiating two persons, groups or collectivities, presupposes them being defined in 
the same terms in the first instance. Two actors, for example, are defined in the same 
terms before contact, but construct their differences after contact. He states that, “we 
could not divide into family groups, regional groups, ethnic and national groups unless
135 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 335.
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we first shared a sense of common identity”.''"  ^He argues that identity conflicts should be 
problematized starting from this common identity. As McSweeney states, “the fracture of 
common identity into self and other...is a second order accomplishment, achieved by 
virtue of the fundamental sense of sameness”. '“*' Thus, the differences between two actors 
that turn them into self and other presuppose, in the first instance,; their ‘sameness’, which 
is the first order accomplishment. Then, their differentiation as the self and the other 
becomes a second order accomplishment. This idea contradicts Wendt’s account of the 
differentiation process between the self and the other, which depicts their construction 
process as a first order accomplishment. To put it in other words, for McSweeney, it is 
the contact of two actors that turns them into self and other. The self and the other are 
defined in the same terms before contact, but they find out their differences and begin to 
define themselves in opposition to one another after contact.
Inayatullah and Blaney ask the question ‘what motivates us to seek others’ in 
an attempt to problematize the ‘other’ as a constitutive element of the ‘self. According 
to this argument, our search for an ‘other’ or an ‘alien’ is driven by two incentives. The 
first is a “desire for confirmation of the worldview that constitutes our self and our 
culture” asking for “validation that our vision is indeed correct, universal and 
valuable”.'“*^ The second is a sense of suspicion that we are incomplete as to our 
worldview or our culture. Thus, we search for the ‘other’ to make us c o m p l e t e . I n  this
HO McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 157.
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sense, the discovery of the other is not incidental but essential for the seifs existence and 
wholeness:
It is within ...[the] space of dilferences and commonalities that cultural 
interactions occur....While commonalities may make communication 
possible, it is the different voices and visions present in the other that 
make dialogue necessary and valuable. It is by finding links between the 
‘dilferent levels andparts’ of various cultures... that a cultural dialogue 
can most usefully be established.'^^
For Nizar Messari the construction of the other is not realized only through negative 
differences and antagonism, but also through ‘approximation’.''*^  In this regard, there are 
two groups of others, allies and enemies. What Messari calls ‘national political identity’ is 
produced and reproduced after contact with allies that create the positive identification of 
the self, and after contact with enemies that follows a negative identi ficat ion.Through 
the contact between the self and its enemy, identity is strengthened by way of specifying 
“what identity is not”, whereas interaction with allies bolsters seifs identity through 
“affuming the links and characteristics that make that specific other an ally”.''*®
As argued above, studying the self-other relationship is an important component 
of the constructivist research on identity. Analyzing the concept of identity with reference 
, to the notions of ‘self and ‘other’ that are defined in contrast to each other is a useful 
way to understand the construction of social categories and social boundaries. The 
self/other opposition is established upon practices of inclusion and exclusion, which 
enables a differentiation between the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’. Applying these notions
Inayatullah and Blaney, “Knowing Encounters,” 79.
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to studies of IR is of great merit in approaching interstate relations in a new way. 
Transcending the studies focusing on the relations among states with fixed, stable and 
unchanging identities, we can gain a perspective on how these identities were established 
in the first place. Such an approach is useful in understanding the construction of 
particular state identities through difference and antagonism, or approximation. Stud3nng 
identity formation employing the notions of self and other enables us to examine how 
actors define their particular identities in opposition to ‘others’. In this way, states’ (as 
well as other social groups’) positive identifications with their allies and their negative 
identifications with their enemies can be made clearer, which in turn constitutes their 
particular roles and identities.
3.3.2 The Boundary Question
Another way to study identity formation fruitfully is to take the boundary formation 
process between the self and other as a point of departure. Such an approach is of great 
merit for it enables us to examine it in the sphere of social interaction. What is of interest 
here is not the physical and economic borders, but the social boundaries between human 
collectivities.
Lars-Erik Cederman employs the notion of boundaries and how they are 
associated with the social construction of the notions ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as an account 
of identity formation. Accordingly, social boundaries, mediating between social 
organizations inside and outside, play a role in shaping collectivities’ notion of
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se l fhood.Cederman presents a number of conceptualizations from diverse disciplines, 
such as sociology, social psychology, geography and anthropology to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the boundary question. In this way, he aims to problematize the 
‘objectified’ identities of rationalist accounts.
Cederman makes use of Georg Simmel’s conflict hypothesis in order to present a 
sociological perspective on the issue. Connecting a group’s inside with its outside, the 
conflict hypothesis suggests that, “external conflict increases in-group cohesion”. 
Cederman summarizes Simmel’s position as follows: “The boundary is not a spatial fact 
with social implications, but rather a sociological fact that forms spatiaUy”.'^' Simmel 
thus adopts a constructivist logic treating the ‘boundary’ as a social fact constructed 
through time and place.
Another sociological theory of the boundary question Cederman makes use of is
Bernhard Giesen’s study on nationalism. For Giesen:
Boundaries separate and divide the actual multitude of interaction 
processes and social relations; they mark the distinction between inside 
and outside, between the foreign and the familiar, kin and alien, friend 
and foe, culture and nature, enlightenment and barbarism. Precisely 
because these boundaries are contingent social constructions that could 
have easily turned out differently, they require social justification and 
symbolic clarification.
Giesen, adopting a historical perspective, situates identity in process and social practices, 
rather than looking for generalizable accounts. He explores the “situational construction
® Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 4.
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of difference”. F o r  him, the boundaries underlying the differences between diverse 
identities are produced through social communication processes. Thus, these boundaries 
draw the demarcation lines of binary thinking, which are expressed as the dichotomies 
between ‘inside and outside’, between ‘the foreign and the familiar’, ‘kin and alien’, 
■‘friend and foe’, ‘culture and nature’, ‘enlightenment and barbarism’.
Political geography is another field that deals with the boundary question. The 
concept ‘spatial socialization’ is introduced by Anssi Paasi to present boundaries as 
political issues rather than “static geographic compartmentalizations”.’ '^' Spatial 
socialization is defined as a process of socialization for individual actors and collectivities, 
through which they become “members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities” 
and develop their collective territorial identit ies.Boundaiies play an exclusionary role 
not only by separating diverse groups from each other, but also triggering the process of 
inclusion and bringing about in-group cohesion by regulating inter-group communication.
In sum, employing the notion of social boundaries, the disciplinary accounts 
presented in Cederman’s work provide an explanation for the social construction of 
identities. Identity formation is regarded as a “dualistic process involving the 
manipulation of boundaries and the manipulation of difference for strategies of inclusion 
and exclusion”. T h e s e  different perspectives hold in common that identities are
 ^Bernhard Giesen, Die Intellektuellen und die Nation: Eine Deutsche Achsenzeit (Frankfnrt: 
Suhrkamp, 1993), 30, quoted in Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 7, author’s 
translation.
Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 7.
Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 8.
Cederman, "Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 8.
Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 9.
52
categorized through the boundaries enabling the in-group communication process and 
excluding the environment of differences.
3.3.3 State Identity
The concept of ‘state identity’ constitutes an important component of the constructivist 
research agenda. Applying the analysis on identity to states, this part considers ‘state 
identity’ as referring to the category of states. The basic argument is that particular 
characteristics and social categories are attributed to states as well as individuals and 
social groups. Thus, a state’s identity refers to its distinguishing features that render it 
different from other states.
David Campbell, who takes an opposing view of the arguments that define 
identity as having a prediscursive, naturalized and unproblematic essence, provides an 
alternative account on state identity.’"^’ He argues that like gender, the state is formed 
through a ‘performative’ constitution. Campbell’s main argument is that, the ‘ontological 
status’ of any state cannot be understood independent of the “various acts, which 
constitute its reality.'^* The discursive acts of policymakers speaking in the name of the 
state and the ‘stylized repetition’ of these acts should be taken into consideration in order 
to provide an account of the construction of state identity.
Campbell develops his argument by making use of the ‘society of normalization’, 
a concept introduced by Michel Foucault. For Campbell, identity is sustained by the
Campbell, Writing Security. 9. 
Campbell, Writing Security, 10. 
Campbell. Writing Security. 10.
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‘society of normalization’. '^  A ‘society of normalization’ is defined as a process of 
legitimation through which certain ‘dispositions’ and ‘orientations’ are adopted. This is 
not a process of the “enforcement of a rule”, but a process o f the “imposition of a 
rule”.'*" Hence, state identity can be understood as an identity ‘achieved’ through the 
repetition of norms, rather than an identity ‘ascribed’ as a foundational quality. States are 
viewed as unfinished entities, always in a process of reproduction.
A different perspective on state identity is developed by feminist theories. Ann 
Tickner demonstrates the “gendered identities of states and their relationship to exterior 
others” and applies this theory to international relations.'*’^  Attributes of states such as 
‘independent’, ‘strong’, and ‘autonomous’ are also characteristics of the sovereign man, 
developed by the realist perspective.'*’^  On the other hand, devalued attributes have an 
association with femindne characteristics and are depicted as “naive, unrealistic, 
irrational”.'*’'' Thus, just as the sovereign man’s construction of its identity in opposition 
to the female other, “the state secures its identity through its relationship to identities of 
devalued and dangerous others”.'*’^  The Western ‘civilized’ state system, for example, has 
constructed its ‘uncivilized’ and ‘dangerous’ others since its establishment.'^’^  Tickner
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Writings and Other Interviews 1972-1977. ed. Colin 
Gordon, (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 106-107; cited in Campbell, Writing Security. 10.
Campbell. Writing Security, 10.
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Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1996), 148.
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argues that such gendered images are still prevalent in world politics, particularly in
Western states’ portrayals of the South. She writes:
[d]ichotomies, such as modern/traditional, rational/irrational,
dynamic/static, and progressive/backward evoke the dyadic
characteristics of sovereign man and the female ‘other’, whose identity 
is constructed in relation to but inferior to the masculine norm.’*’^
The portrayal of the North as a ‘zone of peace’, and the South as a ‘zone of turmoil’ is an
example of this dichotomous construction. Underdevelopment, instability and conflict
appear as a part of Southern states’ common identity since they have not reached the
North’s level o f development. To sum up, feminists argue that all constructions o f
identity and difference are gendered, which is also used as a means of constructing
particular state identities. National identities are constructed by differentiating the valued
ones from the devalued, thus establishing social and cultural hierarchies and justifying
expansionist policies, which create the source of insecurities.'*’*
A similar perspective on state identity is developed by Joan Cocks, who considers
state identity to be affected by the regime of ‘masculine/feminine’, an argument adopted
by Campbell. Campbell draws a parallel between ‘the body’ and the state, since the state
is seen as a ‘sexed body’.'^'' Both the human body and the state are produced by means of
the masculine/feminine dichotomy where the former is a dominant, superior and desirable
identity, whereas the latter is viewed as inferior and as a deviation of the former.
Tickner, “Identity in International Relations Theory,” 158. 
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Campbell argues that the identity of any state is constructed with ‘prior codes o f gender’, 
which eventually become norms conducting behavior.
As to Wendt’s account on the issue, he maintains, “states are real actors to which 
we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and 
intentionality”.’’  ^ As presented before, Wendt argues that states possess corporate, type, 
role and collective identities at different j u n c tu re s .S ta t e s  possess type identities, as 
they are categorized according to ‘regime types’ or ‘forms of state’”. I n  this way, 
states are categorized as ‘capitalist’, ‘fascist’, ‘monarchial’ and etc. He adds, however, 
“not aU shared characteristics become type identities”. A s  an example, he puts forth 
that two states’ having parliamentary systems does not make them alike, and two states 
with parliamentary and presidential systems may have the same type identity, as both are 
democratic.
McSweeney considers state identity in its inner and outer dimensions, the former 
referring to ‘societal identity’ and the latter to ‘state identity’. On that account, state 
identity is constructed through two layers: through the interaction with other states (outer 
dimension) and the interaction among people comprising the domestic realm (inner 
dimension).’’  ^ By means of the international negotiating process with other states, a state 
learns and constructs its outer dimension (state identity). In the domestic interaction 
process, on the other hand, the state manipulates its resources to ensure that societal
Campbell. Writing Security, 11.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 197. 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 224-233. 
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identity is consistent with state identity.’^ * Thus, McSweeney explains state identity 
formation in these two dimensions. Just to focus on the outer dimension of identity 
formation is, for McSweeney, to disregard the domestic layer or societal identity, which 
provides the legitimacy necessary for the conduct of foreign policy. Merely to emphasize 
the societal identity, on· the other hand, leads us to ignore the “malleability o f  state 
identity through international negotiation and to imply...[that] state identity is fixed and 
unproblematic” .'
3.4 Conclusion
The use of the concept identity extended in IR theorizing in the post-Cold War era. 
Constructivism is an approach that brings identity to the center of the study of 
international politics, rather than treating it as a soft concept like the rationalists regard it. 
Adopting a sociological conception of identity, constructivists denaturalize the concept to 
demonstrate that identity is not static and complete, but a dynamic notion transforming 
over time. In this way, constructivists take an interest in examining the social values and 
forms of behavior within which identities are constructed, because it is within these fields 
that identities acquire a meaning through social interaction.
As stated above, many characteristics of identity attributed to individuals and 
social groups can be ascribed to states as well. In this regard, state identity appears as a 
significant analytical tool in studying the particular characteristics of states ascribed by
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 226. 
McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests. 160.
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state elites through processes of policymaking. Thus, the identity of a state is what 
decision-making mechanisms portray as a ‘self and establish what the state is and what it 
is not, its distinguishing qualities, and its place in the world among various ‘others’. 
When we consider that state identities are chosen, manipulated and mobilized by foreign 
policy elites, foreign policy becomes a mechanism for both constructing and representing 
a particular state identity. Foreign policies are formulated by elites’ preferences and utility 
calculations. As such, foreign policy is a significant practice in choosing, establishing and 
maintaining a particular perspective on states’ identities. In this regard, apart from the 
conventional understanding treating foreign policy as merely the diplomatic relations 
among states, we must analyze foreign policy as an identity constructing practice. To this 
end, the following chapter analyzes the construction of state identity by way of foreign 
policy representations. Adopting a constructivist perspective, it is argued that foreign 
policy is a representational practice that portrays a particular vision of the state and its 
international relations. In this way, foreign policy is studied as the mechanism through 
which the state (as the self) is constructed in opposition to various ‘others’ through 
practices of inclusion and exclusion.
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CHAPTER IV: FOREIGN POLICY AS A BOUNDARY
PRODUCING PRACTICE
4.1 Introduction
Studying foreign policy as a boundary producing practice, this chapter examines the 
construction of state identity by way of foreign policy representations. From a 
constructivist perspective, foreign policy is viewed as a matter of self-definition; a 
practice defining what we are and how we see others. The conventional approach takes 
states’ foreign policies as either a function of the requirements of the international system 
or the conduct of a series of rational choices made by self-interested policy actors. 
Different from this understanding, this chapter argues that foreign policy is not only the 
conduct of diplomatic practices for the pursuit of well-defined interests of states, but also 
a practice constructing these states and their interests in the first place. In this way, 
foreign policy is introduced as a mechanism that reflects and contributes to changes in 
conceptions of state identity.
Drawing on the understanding that states are identity-bearing entities, this chapter 
introduces the significance of fomign policy practices in the construction of state identity. 
An analysis of the relationship between foreign policy and identity is rewarding. This
For this argument see David Campbell. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the 
Politics of Identity. 2"'* rev.ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Jutta Weldes, 
“Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations 2:3 (1996); and Weldes, 
“The Cultural Production of Crises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba,” in Cultures of Insecurity: States. 
Communities, and the Production of Danger. Jutta Weldes et al eds. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999).
chapter explores how the two concepts can effectively be associated. It analyzes how 
foreign policy elites represent their states’ identities. The chapter deals with the questions 
‘how do elites categorize their states’ identities and those of others’, and ‘what behaviors 
are deemed appropriate for each category’.
The study of discourse analysis becomes significant at this juncture. As stated in 
Chapter I, discourse is a specific way to talk about, understand and make meaning of the 
world.'**’ Through discursive practices, people represent a particular picture o f what they 
think about their environment. Following the argument that “every practice has a 
corresponding discourse”,'*  ^ this chapter examines foreign poUcy as a practice of 
poUcymakers that pictures particular aspects of world politics through particular lenses. 
Discourse analysis suggests looking at certain types of discourses associated with the 
construction of a particular identity. Elites create official languages destined to exclude 
identities that are deemed foreign to the seifs identity, and include those that are 
regarded as part of ‘us’. Particular types of representations are employed in foreign policy 
to portray the self and to distinguish it from the other. This chapter discusses how elites’ 
shared understandings and representations shape the notions, of the self and the other to 
construct a particular identity for the state. Discourse analysis is a useful tool in this
Marianne Winther J0rgensen and Louise Phillips, Diskurs Analyse som Teori og Metode (Discourse 
Analysis as Theory and Method) (Roskilde Uniyersitetsforlag/Samfundslitteratur, 1999); cited in Trine 
Schreiber and Camilla Moring, “Codification of Knowledge Using Discorse Analysis,” 4. Paper 
presented at Nordic Conference on Information and Documentation, Reykjayik: Iceland, May 30-June 1, 
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Accessed on 15.04.2002.
Senjoy Banerjee, ‘The Cultural Logic of National Identity Formation: Contending Discourses in Late 
Colonial India,” in Culture and Foreign Policy, Valerie Hudson ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1997), 31.
60
regard, as its goal is to analyze actors’ particular representations of identities and social 
relations.
4.2 The Role of Foreign Policy in the Construction of State Identity
As argued in the previous chapter, many characteristics of identity attributed to
individuals and social groups can also be ascribed to states. Thus, state identity appears
as a significant area of analysis in International Relations. The identity of a state is what
particular decision-making mechanisms specify as ‘self and thus establish ‘what the state
is and what it is not’; its distinguishing qualities, and its place in the world among various
‘others’. In this way, foreign policy becomes the mechanism for both constructing and
representing state identity in international relations.
Bill McSweeney challenges the conventional understanding that takes foreign
policy as unproblematic practices of states with fixed identities. He argues that identities
attributed to states should be problematized as they are not standing ‘out there’ to be
discovered. What is ‘out there’ for McSweeney is rather the
identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals, and 
countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, 
negotiating, manipulating or affirming a response to the demand...for a 
collective image.
For McSweeney, one should look at the process through which state identity is 
articulated in order to analyze how it was constructed. It is the ‘identity discourse’ of a 
number of actors engaged in constituting a particular image for the state that constructs 
state identity.
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David Campbell is another scholar offering an alternative understanding to foreign 
policy and identity. As stated before, for Campbell identity is formed in relation to 
difference, in a performative process having “no foundations that are prior to, or outside 
of, its operation”.A cco rd in g ly , the identity of each state is performatively constituted. 
Campbell argues that identities are constituted by means of boundaries serving as 
demarcation lines to separate ‘inside’ from ‘outside’, ‘self from ‘other’, and ‘domestic’ 
from ‘foreign’.'*  ^ He states that identities are constructed in particular historical and 
“spatially defined locations” and in relation to otherness.'**’ Thus, the pohtics of 
otherness, by inscribing boundaries between inside and outside, makes foreign policy 
possible.'*’
Campbell retheorizes the conventional accounts, the roots of which can be found
in Hobbes’ understanding of international politics. “The strategies of otherness” play an
important role in Hobbes’ depicting international relations as a realm of anarchy, which
Campbell employs to support his point:
The spaces of inside and outside serve to delineate the rational, ordered 
polity in which good, sane, sober, modest and civilized ‘man’ resides 
from the dangerous, chaotic, and anarchical realm in which the evil, 
mad, drunk, arrogant and savage people are found.'**
What follows from this statement in Campbell’s analysis is that, foreign policy is not the
end result of an unproblematic state system or the relations among states, but is an
Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: 
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‘integral’ part of state construction and international r e l a t i o n s . I n  this way, ‘man’, 
‘state’ and ‘international relations’ are not entities having ontological priority over one 
another, but are ‘mutually constitutive’. C a m p b e l l  challenges those views that regard 
state identities as unproblematic and having prior existence to foreign policy. He 
maintains that it is foreign policy as a boundary establishing practice that constitutes the 
state and the international system, not the other way r o u n d . T h u s ,  he takes issue with 
the accepted views that regard foreign policy as relations between states that are
192separated by “ahistorical, frozen and pregiven boundaries”.
Campbell, in his analysis, views foreign policy as “boundary-producing practices 
central to the production and reproduction of identity in whose name it operates”, rather 
than “the external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities’’.’^  ^ As such, 
he distinguishes between uppercase ‘Foreign Policy’ (the conventionally defined task of 
representing a country’s interests abroad), from lowercase ‘foreign policy’ (the process of 
constructing the broader context of identity and difference that informs Foreign Policy). 
Such an understanding adds another dimension to accounts on foreign policy. 
Accordingly, foreign policy is viewed not only as the “external orientation of 
preestablished states with secure identities”, b u t  also as the practice through which the 
boundaries between inside and outside are demarcated. In other words, the first 
understanding (foreign policy) corresponds to the construction of state identity through
Campbell, Writing Security. 60. 
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difference, whereas the second (Foreign Policy) is associated with the maintenance and 
reproduction of the identity through conventional diplomatic practices. Thus, ‘foreign 
policy’ constructs the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside, the ‘self and the ‘other’ in the first place, 
through practices of inscribing exterior dangers, whereas ‘Foreign Policy’, conducted 
upon these representations, maintains and secures state; identity through diplomacy.
McSweeney criticizes Campbell for his “implicit causal argument” that 
understands foreign policy as driven by state identity alone thus ignoring the role of 
interests in the identity formation p r o c e s s . F o r  McSweeney, Campbell neglects the role 
played by domestic interests in the formation of state identity and security policy. 
McSweeney emphasizes the crucial role played by interests in identity formation, viewing 
interests as the motivational factors in presenting particular situations as dangerous, and 
specific others as threats. McSweeney argues that bureaucratic and military interests 
influence greatly the cultural environment and the self-understandings of actors, which, in 
the end, have an impact on the formulations of state identity.
Another scholar giving foreign policy an autonomous role in the construction of 
state identity is Nizar Messari. Messari maintains that “[f]oreign policy is...an identity­
making tool that erects boundaries between the self and the other, defining in the process 
what are national interests”. A r g u i n g  that identity is constructed upon the opposition 
between the self and the other, he views ‘difference’ as a prerequisite for identity to
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e x i s t .M e s s a r i  stresses the importance of specific representations of the world through 
foreign policy, namely the “practices of speech” in making meaningful the environment 
we live in, and permanently constructing and reconstructing our identity.
Different from Campbell (who holds that difference is converted into otherness in
the identity formation process) Messari argues that this conversion is not realized
unidimensionaUy, but has two faces: assimilation and otherness.^*’ For Messari, identity is
either assimilated or transformed into an other:
On the domestic stage, difference is maintained as if it were indifferent, 
that is, as the confirmation of identity only. On the... international stage, 
whenever identity is threatened, or has to be otherwise secured, there 
follows either the transformation of difference into otherness, or the 
assimilation of difference as a friend.^* '^
For Messari, the construction of identity is conducted through ‘alterity’. In this manner, 
the self might place itself either in an equal or superior position to the other. In cases 
where the other is inferior to the self, ‘politics of annihilation’ is likely to take place. 
Accordingly, through moral justifications, the self tries to keep the other in restraint. 
Messari writes: “Justifications of annihilation vary from ‘it was in self-defense’ to ‘it was 
necessary’ to ‘there existed a serious threat which now has been eliminated’”.^ °^  Thus, 
violence toward the other is legitimized through devaluing it and emphasizing the moral 
superiority of the self.
A further constructivist perspective examining the role of foreign policy practices 
in the construction of state identity is introduced by Michael Shapiro. Shapiro views
Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” 228. 
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foreign policy as a process producing the ‘foreign or exotic’ and, in this way, the other. 
He holds that foreign policy discourse is regulated by a geopolitical and historically 
developed representational practice, which is a way of constituting the other and 
downgrading it in a lesser moral space.^ *^ ·^  Shapiro argues that the construction of the 
other is “not an innocent exercise in differentiation”, but a political practice that is 
“closely linked to how the self is understood”.^ *’^  The understanding of the different as the 
‘other’ is a pohtically oriented practice and is value driven. In other words, considering 
who is different as part of ‘us’ or ‘them’ is realized through particular acts aiming at a 
particular end. Drawing upon this view, Shapiro states the results of the self/other 
classification as follows:
[A]ny other that is accorded the same status as the self...will be 
accorded the same prohibitions and restrictions from harm or 
interference as well as the same entitlements. However, to the extent 
that the other is regarded as something not occupying the same 
natural/moral space as the self, conduct toward the self becomes more 
exploitive.^®^
According to this argument, those deemed part of ‘us’ are elevated to the same level of 
the ‘self, whereas those situated as ‘others’ are downgraded to a lesser moral space; a 
categorization that legitimizes exploitive behavior towards those particular ‘others’.
Building upon this understanding, Shapiro draws a parallel between foreign policy 
and gender policy. Both are regarded as practices of lowering the status of the other. He 
argues that
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[gjender policy, as it is practiced in everyday life is...foreign policy”, since it 
is the practice of making “strange something which one could instead 
identify or accord the status of another self with equal dignity and 
importance”.^ *’^
Thus, foreign policy is associated with gender policy that is based on drawing boundaries 
between differences and then according unfair roles to each side, rather than regarding 
them as equally important.
To sum up, foreign policy is the mechanism for both constructing and 
representing state identity in international relations. Transcending the conventional 
understanding that take foreign policy as unproblematic practices of states with fixed 
identities, it is argued that foreign policy is a performative process constructing the 
objects and subjects of policy conduct in the first place. It is maintained that state identity 
is performatively constituted through foreign policy practices that draw the boundaries 
between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, the ‘self and the ‘other’, and the ‘domestic’ and 
the ‘foreign’. Thus, it is through the politics of otherness/difference (inscribing the 
boundaries between the inside and the outside) that makes foreign pohcy possible.
4.3 Identity as a Discursive Construct
The study of identity formation is a crucial component of constructivist studies, and thus 
the role of language and discourse becomes significant. Discourse analysis constitutes a 
useful way of conducting constructivist research. As maintained in Chapters II and III, 
constructivism treats identity—whether individual or group— not as deriving from the 
‘nature’ of the world, but as a situational and relational social construction. Identities are
206 Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, 101.
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not self-evident, natural or inevitable entities, but are the “products of deliberate 
calculation’’.^ *^  ^ On that account, identities are constructed through discursive practices. 
To provide a thorough explanation of this issue, the role played by language in particular 
foreign policy representations should be discussed.
Rhetoric is important in constructivist studies, since it is speech-acts that 
constitute the basis of social relations. Iver Neumann criticizes the Foreign Policy 
Analysis literature for ignoring the study of language. He argues that the basic 
shortcoming of these studies is their understanding of language as an unproblematic 
means for transforming information among individuals. He holds that in order to 
understand social relations, language should be the ‘object of study’, since language is 
more than just a “vessel for the transformation of meaning”.^ ®*
Language, as Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe argue, is not only a naming 
device, but also a means of production. Language has the power to create meaning. '^^^ 
The language used by defense intellectuals in representations of nuclear weapons and 
war, for example, “plays a central role in constructing part of strategic identity”.^  
Following Carol Cohn, Zalewski and Enloe maintain that the use o f euphemisms and 
abstractions such as “clean bombs, surgical strikes...SRAMS (short range attack
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missiles)” aims at camouflaging the destructive capacities of these weapons.^” 
Accordingly, strategists represent US nuclear defense policy in such a way that public 
support becomes possible. Thus is prepared the ground for the establishment of US 
strategic identity.
It is further argued by Zalewski and Enloe that strategic discourse is 
fundamentally gendered. The language of masculinity plays a central role in identity 
formation and war, which was the case in the Gulf War. By representing the United 
States as the ‘righteous protector of the world’, Iraq as an ‘evil destructive force’, and 
Kuwait as being ‘raped’, the positions of the respective states with regard to one another 
were depicted in a way to gather public support for the war. This is the politics of 
constructing a negative image of the ‘other’ “in favor of the self’. In the final analysis, 
as Zalewski and Enloe argue, the Gulf War “took place against that image, against the 
representation of Iraq, not Iraq itself’.^ ''*
Jutta Weldes is another scholar providing a constructivist account of the discursive 
production of identities and interests. She maintains that national interests are social 
constructions established by the representations of foreign policy decision-makers that 
work on behalf of the state.^*^ These policy-makers portray particular representations for 
their state, for other states, and for the international system, “to make sense of
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international relations” and to be able to “act in a particular situation they face” .^ '*^  The 
self and the other are identified by their particular identities, such as ‘leader’, 
‘aggressive’, ‘hostile’ and ‘peaceful’. Thus, “well-defined relations among” states are set 
up which help to draw the boundaries between the states that are part of ‘us’ and those 
that produce threats, and in this way are deemed part of ‘them’.^”  By establishing the 
identities of states in relation to one another and portraying their relations in particular 
ways, the guide for policy conduct is established.
Weldes further argues that meaning is produced through the connotations ascribed
to linguistic elements that are already in use in a society. Representations of the world in
particular ways becomes possible by the meanings attached to linguistic elements. To
illustrate her point, Weldes argues that the word ‘totalitarianism’ was used as a
connotation of ‘expansionism’ and ‘aggression’ in US foreign policy discourse during the
Cold War, mostly to picture the Soviets.^'’ Weldes maintains that the world can be
differently represented and constructed since
linguistic elements can be disarticulated and then rearticulated in 
different ways....Objects, actions, events and relations...do not simply 
present themselves to us in an unmediated or self-evident fashion.
Instead, their meaning for us is created; it is produced by articulating 
different linguistic elements so as to create and render persuasive one 
particular description or set of associations and not another.^^”
According to Weldes, after specific relations are positioned in relation to one another in
this way, individuals come to identify themselves with the subject positions that make
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sense to them. Hence, not only the subject position of a state, but also the community in
221whose name it operates is created.
The basic features of a discourse are presented by Weldes and Diana Saco. The
authors maintain that a discourse is both linguistic and intersubjective:
It is linguistic in that language is a central sign system that provides the 
resources out of which representations are constructed. It is 
intersubjective in that the language through which people construct 
meaning is necessarily shared.““^
The inter.subjectivity of a discourse is expressed by William Connolly as well. For 
Connolly, a shared language is the ‘medium’ through which “ideas, judgements, 
purposes, and emotions are constituted”.^ ^^  According to this argument, intersubjectivity 
constructs the common ground by the agency of which people “share a range of criteria
224for making distinctions, picking out objects [and] reaching judgments”.
Weldes and Saco further state that a discourse is not merely a linguistic practice. 
They argue that it may also be non-linguistic. As to the non-linguistic aspects of the US 
discourse on the Cuban Missile Crisis^^^, they present practices such as “blockading an 
island, implementing an embargo, infiltrating cover action units, organizing a counter­
revolutionary underground movement, and engaging in acts of economic and industrial
Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 288.
Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive 
Construction of ‘The Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” Millenium 25:2 (1996): 373.
William E.Connolly, Appearance and Reality in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 110, quoted in Weldes and Saco, “Making State Action Possible,” 373.
Connolly, Appearance and Reality, 110.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, the reason of which was the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, 
constitutes one of the most important conflicts between the US and the USSR of the Cold War period. 
For a detailed analysis of the discursive construction of the Crisis see Weldes and Saco, “Making State 
Action Possible.”
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sabotage”.^ ^^  They regard these non-Iinguistic practices as having equal significance with 
linguistic ones in the construction of state identities.
Jonathan Bach is another scholar who attaches special importance to discourse. 
He argues that discourse has the power to create and sustain meaning in social relations. 
He views the discursive representations of events, situations and histories through 
narratives as central to national policy formation, since narratives define the subjects 
(individual or collective) in the international arena. Shared narratives are seen as the 
driving force behind collective subjectivity and the construction of identities.^^^
The study of narratives acquires further emphasis in Bach’s work. He sees a 
narrative as both constitutive of collective identity and the “context in which politics is 
played out”.“^ * According to him, “reality is a narrative experience” created through the 
language practices of policymakers.^^^ Language gives narratives and identities a 
direction. Formulated in a particular way, they establish ‘a coherent story’ which provides 
the ‘material base’ of a ‘salient identity’.^ °^ In short, narratives play a crucial role in 
giving direction to and shaping a particular identity. So long as these narratives are 
perpetuated in both public and international realms through repetitions, they create 
around themselves “a cloak of normalcy”.^ ’^ And “[wjhat is normal seems natural” .^ ^^
Weldes and Saco, “Making State Action Possible,” 374-375.
Sanjoy Banerjee, “Constructivism in International Studies: Cognitive Science, Interaction, and 
Narrative Structure,” 1996. Paper presented at International Studies Association, April 16-20, San 
Diego, California, 10, cited in Bach. Between Sovereignty and Integration, 56.
Jonathan P.G. Bach. Between sovereignty and integration: German Foreign Policy and National 
Identity After 1989 (Munster. Germany : Lit Verlag ; New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999): 44. 
Bach. Between Sovereignty and Integration. 47.
Bach. Between Sovereignty and Integration. 48.
Bach. Between Sovereignty and Integration. 50.
Bach. Between Sovereignty and Integration. 50.
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Thus, narratives provide policymakers with the institutionalized stories that legitimize the 
conduct o f their policies.
Discourse analysis is a useful tool in examining the social construction o f state 
identity. By analyzing the particular meaning systems associated with particular identities, 
it provides the analytical framework for the discursive construction of state identities 
through foreign policy discourses. Foreign policy discourses of elites shape a particular 
worldview about a state’s place in the world. A particular state identity is mobilized 
through shared discursive practices. Foreign policy is the mechanism through which these 
practices are conducted. As such, discourse analysis becomes a significant tool in 
studying state identity as a discursive construct of foreign policy elites.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter argued that state identities are formed through foreign policy practices; 
namely the discourses articulated around political circles and the public domain. As such, 
identity becomes a matter o f political choice and manipulation, rather than being fixed 
with essential qualities. Different aspects of a state’s identity formation process are 
presented in this chapter. Treating foreign policy as a boundary producing practice that 
constructs the objects and the subjects of international politics, this chapter focused on 
how foreign policy becomes a means for producing and reproducing state identity. It 
analyzed the way policymakers portray their states’ identities through foreign policy 
discourses.
The study of discourse analysis becomes a useful tool in examining the social 
construction of state identity through foreign policy representations. It suggests looking
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at the particular meaning system associated with a particular identity. Discourse analysis 
provides the analytical framework for the discursive construction of particular state 
identities through foreign policy representations. States as well as other social groups and 
individuals, are considered as identity bearing entities as argued in the previous chapters. 
Foreign policy is the mechanism through which particular representations, and the 
identities of states are constructed. Foreign policies and identities of states are not 
independent of policymakers’ interpretations and representations. Deliberate calculations 
of policymakers shape a particular worldview about their state’s place in the world. They 
become meaningfiil through shared discursive practices. Foreign policy becomes the 
mechanism through which this worldview is articulated. Thus, the study of discourse 
analysis becomes one of the central themes of constructivist research.
Identity discourses of political leaders have the power to create particular images 
of their states in particular and the world in general. Drawing upon this understanding, 
constructivism adopts a different perspective on foreign policy practices from that o f 
conventional approaches. According to the constructivist approach, foreign policy is not 
just a function of national interests pursued in line with rational choices. Rather, it is the 
practices constructing the actors and interests in the first place. Foreign policy discourse 
constructs the basis of the identities of the ‘self and the ‘other’ through portraying them 
in particular ways. Once identity is constructed, it becomes the guide to foreign policy 
conduct in the conventional sense, i.e., diplomatic relations among states.
As argued in Chapter II, constructivism maintains that social structures, relations, 
practices and institutions in international relations are not ‘natural’ and objective ‘facts’, 
but ever-changing entities deliberately created through social interaction. They are
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created through the meanings attached to them in processes of understanding, 
interpretation and acting upon them. Turkey’s NATO membership and the meanings 
attached to the alliance is no exception to this process. NATO membership acquired 
meaning in Turkish politics by way of the shared understandings of state elites. By 
ascribing a Western identity to the organization, elites represented Turkey’s NATO 
membership as an indication that Turkey was a Western state. The next chapter analyzes 
the construction of Turkey’s Western identity during the Cold War via NATO discourse. 
It demonstrates how policymakers represented Turkey’s entering the Atlantic Alliance as 
an indication that Turkey was a Western state.
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CHAPTER V: REPRESENATATIONS OF NATO IN TURKISH 
FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE DURING THE COLD WAR
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an alternative way to study Turkey’s NATO membership during the 
Cold War. In Turkish political discourse during the Cold War, the cause of NATO 
membership has been linked to Westernizing the country. According to this 
understanding, by entering NATO, Turkey not only became a member o f a military 
alliance, but also a member of the Western civilization. This civilization was deemed to 
symbolize modernity, liberalism, democracy, the rule of law and secularism. These were 
the attributes ascribed to Turkey’s membership in NATO by the Turkish foreign policy 
discourse during the Cold War.
A close reading of Turkish foreign policy texts reveals the project of westernizing 
the country. This chapter suggests that the discourse produced with regard to Turkey’s 
NATO membership brings to view the efforts of eûtes to turn Turkey into a ‘modern’, 
‘democratic’ and ‘civilized’ coiantry. As NUiifer Göle argues, the ‘Westernization’ and 
‘Europeanization’ of Turkey are expressed through participation in Western institutions 
(one being NATO) and the adoption of ideas and manners from the West.^ '^  ^
Policymakers represented the adoption of Western political and administrative institutions 
as an indication that Turkey was a Western state. Thus, analyzing the texts on Turkey’s
NATO membership is a beneficial way to examine the representations of Turkey as a 
Western state.
NATO discourse in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War fits into the general 
context of Cold War politics. Turkish foreign policy discourse represented Turkey as a 
part of the ‘Western self that was exalted in the face of the ¡‘Eastern other’. NATO 
membership symbolized Turkey’s Westemness, its dedication to modernity, democracy 
and human rights. It became a means for drawing the boundaries between the internal 
(the West) that manifested enlightenment, civilization and development and the external 
(The East) that represented autocracy, underdevelopment and corruption. These are 
some of the most conspicuous forms of the Cold War discourse in Turkish foreign policy, 
which are analyzed in detail in this chapter.
Making use of the arguments expressed by Turkey’s foreign policy elites and 
academics published in the journal Foreign Policy, this chapter analyzes how NATO was 
represented not only as a military organization, but also as a cultural one manifesting a 
Western identity. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section 
introduces a brief discussion of the works in IR literature studying NATO as a ‘cultural 
alliance’. In the second section, I turn to the representations of the Cold War in Turkish 
foreign policy discourse. Here, the argument is that, Turkey’s NATO membership during 
the Cold War was understood not merely as a military guarantee against the Soviet 
‘threat’, but a means for identifying Turkey with the Western states.
Nilüfer Göle, ‘The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity,” available from world 
wide web htlD://www.ciaonet.org/book/bozdogan06.hlml. Accessed on 15.04.2002.
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The second section is divided into four parts. The first part presents a revealing 
analysis of Turkish policymakers’ decision to participate in the Korean War along with 
the Western states in 1950. In light of Jennifer Milliken’s argument that the Korean War 
was of symbolic value that served as a means for constructing the Western collective 
identity, it is argued that Turkey’s participation in the intervention was a symbohc act as 
well, designed to demonstrate Turkey’s dedication to Western values. The following part 
examines how the Soviet Union was represented as the ‘other’ of Turkey as a 
constitutive component of the Westernization discourse. This section examines the role 
played by the narrative of ‘Soviet threat’ in Turkish foreign policy discourse as a 
significant element in the establishment and perpetuation of Turkey’s Western identity. It 
is examined how creating an ‘other’ (Soviets) whose way of life is different from that of 
the self (Turkey) made it easier to draw the boundaries of Turkey’s Western identity. 
Next, the chapter introduces NATO as a security community. This part explores how 
elites portrayed NATO as a cultural alliance that was represented as an indication of 
Turkey’s Western identity. Finally, the roles—and thus the identity—accorded by elites 
to Turkey as a member of NATO is analyzed. Elites’ role conceptions for Turkey by way 
of focusing on its NATO membership are examined. Statements ascribing Turkey a 
particular ‘role identity’ in opposition to the Soviet Union’s counter-role are analyzed. It 
is argued that elites’ role constructions confined the boundaries of Turkey’s identity as 
well as its behavior.
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5.2 Representing NATO as a ‘Cultural Alliance’
NATO was designed after the Second World War to provide mutual defense to its 
members in the case of a military attack. As to Turkey’s NATO membership, however, 
Turkey’s foreign policy elites represented the alliance not simply in military terms. 
Through promoting a standardized discourse representing the alliance as the champion of 
Western strategic identity, they added a cultural dimension to NATO. In this way, they 
constructed bounds of identification with the West.
Turkey’s NATO membership constitutes one of the milestones in the efforts to 
identify Turkey with the Western identity. As of 1952, the year of Turkey’s accession to 
NATO, Turkey became a committed ally of the Atlantic Alliance, serving in the southern 
flank as a counterweight to the Soviet ‘threat’. As stated above, NATO was conceived as 
a military organization to provide collective defense to its members in the case of a 
military attack. Being the meeting platform of ‘Western democracies’ in the bipolar 
world, it also turned into a champion of ‘Western strategic culture’, where culture was 
“distinctly placed within a militarily maintained identity against the adversarial ‘other’”.^ '^'
The emergence and endurance of NATO was ensured thanks to the narratives on 
NATO’s identity.^^^ Michael Williams and Iver Neumann, in their article ‘From Alliance 
to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity’ develop a study on 
the relationship between identities, narrative structures and institutions in the social 
construction of ‘security communities’. Their basic argument is that, the narratives on
GUlnur Aybet and Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold 
War: Turkey’s Problematic Relationship with Europe,” International Journal 55 (2000): 575.
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NATO portrayed the organization as the ‘military guarantor of Western civilization’, the 
coherence of which rested not only on the common Soviet ‘threat’, but also on ‘cultural 
and civilizational’ ties.^ *^’ Adopting a constructivist perspective, Williams and Neumann 
argue that it was a ‘symbolic position’ that NATO occupied, where its members attached 
the organization a security role through articulating the ‘threats’ toward their 
existence.^^^ It was by means of the discourse on threat that the solidarity of the alliance 
and the coherence among its members was ensured. These shared understandings and 
interests led to the articulation of a collective identity.
Williams and Neumann argue that NATO’s narrative included “[c]laims about the 
cultural and political nature of the AUiance and the Cold War”,^ *^ a point presented 
clearly in the preamble of NATO’s founding treaty. Here, the signatories defined 
themselves “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of 
other peoples, founded upon principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of
law” .^ ^^  Thus, Williams and Neumann maintain that NATO has been the manifestation of 
a broad cultural context amalgamating members of common cultural traits. With 
reference to the shared ideals and interests stated above, they maintain that NATO has 
served as a means for constructing its members’ particular identities by marking their 
differences from the Eastern bloc states. These ‘ideological rationalizations’^ '*® secured
Michael C.Williains and Iver B. Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, 
and the Power of Identity,” Millennium 29:2 (2000)361.
Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 361.
Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 365.
Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 367.
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty (Brussels, 1949) cited in Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to 
Security Community,” 367-368.
Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 385.
80
the borders between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’, elevating the Western values to the 
highest level, while downgrading the Eastern way of life.
In the same vein with Williams and Neumann, Jennifer MiUiken maintains that the 
Cold War was a conflict not only between the two superpowers, but one encompassing 
broader “groupings of states...the ‘West’ and the ‘East’”.^ “' She argues in her study 
entitled ‘Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea’ that the 
‘insecurities’ of these two blocs were “not given, but...(re)constructed through 
discourse”.^ “*^ For Milliken, it was the “ordering of terms, meanings, and practices” that 
established the categorizations of Cold War.^''^ Her basic concern is to highlight how 
policymakers, through security discourses, represented Korea as constituting a threat to 
the Western world.
According to Milliken, it was the “discursive construction of danger...by 
authorities” that intervention in Korea was made possible.^''^ The articulation of a ‘threat’ 
towards the ‘collective identification’ of the West enabled the participation of other states 
that deemed themselves part of the West in the intervention. '^*^ U.S discourse employed a 
number of binary dichotomies to justify Western intervention. Western states were 
represented as ‘democracies’, ‘liberal and moderate’, whereas Eastern bloc states were 
portrayed as ‘totalitarians’ and ‘puppets’ of Moscow.Addi t iona l ly ,  U.S. state
Jennifer Milliken, “Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea,” in Cultures of 
Insecurity: States. Communities and the Production of Danger, Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh 
Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 92. 
Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 92.
Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 92.
Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 93.
Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 92.
^'ldliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 100-101.
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discourse represented “[t]he survival of the United States...dependent on the survival of 
an ‘us’ of the democratic West”.^ “*’ Such was the ‘West’ constructed in Korea, through 
‘hading’ ‘followers’ of the ‘Free World’ to participate in the war.
Since Turkey was the ‘southern bastion’^ '** of this cultural posture, Turkish
policymakers have come to represent Turkey along the same cultural traits. As Ali
Karaosmanoglu has argued, Turkey’s accession to NATO was a significant step towards
Westernizing the country. He writes:
Beyond the Soviet threat after the Second World War, Turkey’s 
decisiveness in joining NATO derived mostly from a profound belief in 
Western values and in the virtues of Western political systems. NATO 
membership solidified Ankara’s Western orientation by establishing a 
long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West.^''^
Accordingly, Karaosmanoglu states the major rationale behind Turkish membership in
NATO as its ‘Western orientation’. For him, policymakers had an interest in turning
Turkey into a Western state, and membership to NATO was of great importance to this
end.
Drawing on Mdliken’s argument that the Cold War was not only a military 
conflict, but also the political ‘battleground’ of the East and West, the following parts 
address the representations of the Turkish State as part of the West during the Cold War. 
Focusing on Turkey’s NATO membership and the Soviets as the ‘other’ as a significant 
component in this construction process, the standardized discursive practices of elites and 
academics are analyzed.
Milliken, “Inlcrvention and Identity,” 102.
Aybet and Ba^, “Transformations in Security and Identity,” 575.
249 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, ‘The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” 
Journal of International Affairs 54-1 (2000); 209.
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5.3 The Cold-War in Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse
As argued before, the Cold War was a confrontation not only between the US and the 
USSR, but one including a larger ‘political-economic’ area where the ‘West’ challenged 
the ‘East’vP  Two different groups of states manifested a cultural positioning in 
opposition to each other. Being a part of the ‘West’ entailed dedication to ideals such as 
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘development’, whereas the East was 
associated with ‘autocracy’, ‘totalitarianism’, ‘corruption’ and ‘underdevelopment’. The 
discourse of the Cold War in which Turkish policymakers were involved was conducted 
on these sets of dichotomies. Although Williams and Neumann argue that the NATO 
narrative, expressing the cultural features attached to the alliance “achieved a new 
prominence” in the aftermath of the Cold War era—a view presented as the rationale 
behind NATO’s endurance — this part suggests that this narrative was prominent in 
Turkish Foreign Policy discourse during the Cold War period as well.
The Cold War insecurity that Turkey was settled within was not an objective and 
natural situation, but a social and cultural production. However, this argument does not 
suggest that a material threat did not exist. What this part deals with is the 
representations of danger in particular ways; how Turkey participated in the widely 
shared meaning system of the Cold War discourse and the politics of representing Turkey 
as a Western state.
Milliken, “Inlervention and Identity,” 91.
Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 368.
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Turkey’s NATO membership throughout the Cold War can be understood as a 
process of self-identification as part of a democratic security community. This process 
also denotes acts of stereotyping the Soviet ‘other.’ In this way, NATO membership 
became a means of expressing a common Western identity vis-à-vis the socialist ‘other’. 
Through metaphors that summoned images like ‘communist totalitarianism’ and 
‘undemocratic and uncivilized’ state systems, NATO discourse turned out to be the nodal 
point around which Turkish Cold War discourse was maintained.
Locating Turkey in the ‘Western geography’, where the ‘West’ confronted the 
‘East’, was a preference of the policymakers. They adjusted the political system to their 
concerns of ‘Westernizing’ and ‘civilizing’ the country. During the Cold War, the Soviet 
‘threat’ became a repetitive theme in Turkish foreign policy discourse, providing the basis 
for the politics of inclusion and exclusion. The far-reaching “discourse of ‘ideological 
geopolitics’”^^  ^of the Cold War settled the world in “two alternative models of political- 
economic organization, the ‘East’ and the ‘West’”^^  ^ that contributed to the politics of 
locating Turkey on the side of the Western world. The way Turkey has dealt with the 
Soviet other became a constitutive component of its self-identification, and the very 
categories created within Turkish foreign policy’s ‘representational repertoire’ secured 
the boundaries of Turkey’s Cold War identity.
John Agnew, Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998), 119, cited in Pınar 
Bilgin, ‘The Making of the ‘Mediterranean’ Region: Changing Geopolitical Images of the European 
Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era,” Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research 
Meeting, Florence, March 20-24, 2002, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 1.
Bilgin, ‘The Making of the ‘Mediterranean’ Region,” 16.
Bradley S. Klein, “Deterrence as a Social Practice,” chap, in Strategic Studies and World Order: The 
Global Politics of Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 140.
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In the following parts, different means of representing Turkey as a Western state 
are analyzed. Employing excerpts from the journal Foreign Policy. I begin by looking at 
Turkey’s participation in the Korean War. This section argues that the intervention aimed 
at demonstrating Turkey’s dedication to Western values. Then, I examine how the Soviet 
Union was represented as the ‘other’ of Turkey and how this representation became 
operative as a constitutive component of the Westernization discourse. In the following 
part, I examine the arguments representing NATO as a security community. This section 
explores how policy makers portrayed NATO as a cultural alliance, which in the end was 
shown as an indication of Turkey’s Western identity. Finally, I analyze the roles accorded 
by policymakers to Turkey as a member of NATO. This part argues that policymakers’ 
particular role conceptions for Turkey within the alliance made clear its position vis-à-vis 
other states. This, in turn, has drawn the boundaries of Turkey’s identity.
5.3.1 Constructing Western Identity Through Intervention
The discursive practices of foreign policy associated with being/becoming a Western state 
in the post-war years can be traced back to the Korean War. Along with other Western 
states, Turkey sent troops to Korea, which was then the battleground between the ‘East’ 
and the ‘West’. Milliken regards the UN-led Western intervention in Korea as “a cultural 
process of collective identity formation” The intervention was indeed a symbolic act 
that constituted Western collective identity in opposition to the ‘socialist other(s)’.
255 Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,'’ 91.
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The following statement by Yulug.Tekin Kurat, a professor of history, indicates
how Turkish policymakers understood participation in the Korean War:
[T]he prominent members of the Turkish government...decided to take 
part in the Korean War. In the first place Turkey had taken such a 
decision in response to the appeal of the United Nations to safeguard 
the integrity and independence of South Korea in accordance with the 
principles of the [UN] Charter....But behind this decision Turkish 
aspirations for joining the Atlantic Alliance were also in mind. It was 
because the theatre of war in Korea prepared the ground for the 
Turkish forces to set an example for their fighting ability with the up to
. . 256date weapons.
Kurat’s statement points to two ‘logics of appropriateness’ for Turkey’s participating in 
the Korean War. First, defending the independence of a sovereign state was seen as the 
appropriate behavior for a member of the United Nations, since complying with the 
stipulations of the UN Charter was regarded the relevant norm. In a sense, Turkey was 
constrained by the ‘social normative structure’^ ^^  o f the UN system. Turkey’s interests 
and identity was informed by the widely held international norms of the UN, which 
guided the state along certain socially prescribed channels of ‘appropriate behaviour’ 
Turkey, as “a country which refrains fi’om unilateral action in times of crisis and works 
through institutional and diplomatic channels”^^  ^ participated in the intervention in order 
to secure this very identity. As Haluk Bayiilken, former Representative of Turkey to the 
United Nations noted, Turkey advocated “the supremacy of the principle of sovereign 
equality of aU peace loving states”, which constituted the basis of the UN Charter^*’® and
Yulug Tekin Kurat, “Turkey’s Entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” Foreign Policy 10:3- 
4 (1983): 74.
Hobson, The Stale and International Relations ,146.
Hobson, The State and International Relations. 146.
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U.Haluk Bayiilken, “Turkey and the United Nations,” Foreign Policy 1:3 (1971), 100.
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“has never lost her faith in the ideals and principles o f the Charter’’.^ '"' The author further 
stated that
[t]his belief of Turkey in the ideals embodied in the Charter was a major 
factor deciding Turkey’s position in the Korean W ar....It was the 
adoptation of...[the UN] resolution which enabled the United Nations 
to send forces to Korea.^^^
In this way, Bayiilken explained Turkey’s participation in the Korean War on the grounds 
that there was “an act of aggression” and “a breach of peace” in Korea, which 
necessitated UN intervention.^*’^  Eventually, Turkey, as a ‘reliable’ member o f the UN 
and a state wholeheartedly advocating the “maintenance of international peace and 
security”,^^ participated in this collective security operation, since it was regarded the 
appropriate behavior for a sovereign member of the UN system. Participation in the 
Korean War was deemed as an international ‘duty’ for the elites. It was the discourse of 
‘duties’ that constituted the legitimate reason for Turkey’s sending troops to Korea. 
Turkey was represented as a state pursuing principles of sovereign equality, coUective 
security and international justice. These were the norms constitutive of ‘the West’. Thus, 
sending troops to Korea was deemed a symbolic act demonstrating Turkey’s dedication 
to international law and Western norms.
The second logic of appropriateness observed in Kurat’s statement on Turkey’s 
participation in the Korean intervention is that it was deemed an appropriate behavior for 
the states that asserted an identity on the part of the Western states to challenge the 
invader. In the Korean War, North Korea, the invader, was represented as “a ‘puppet
Bayiilken, “Turkey and the United Nations,” 102. 
Bayiilken, “Turkey and the United Nations,” 102-103. 
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state’ of the Soviet Union”.^ ^^  Turkey, on the other hand, became the ‘supporter’ of the 
collective action in the eyes of US policymakers. This point is an indication that, 
particular norms associated with an identity have a persuasive effect on state behavior. To 
clarify the point, states behave in accordance with the roles ascribed to them, since such 
behaviors verify and strengthen their particular identities. The Korean intervention was 
based on the shared norms and understandings of the Western collectivity. As the 
‘supporter’ of the intervention, Turkey pursued a policy consistent with the policies of 
other Western states. Through participating the war, Turkey acted in conformity with the 
norms of being a ‘Western state’.
Three related representations emphasizing the correlation between Turkey’s 
participating in the Korean War and becoming a NATO member are presented below. In 
Metin Tamko^’s words.
The invasion of South Korea provided an opportunity for [President]
Bayar to demonstrate his strong desire for solidarity within the West.
He decided to send a contingent of 5,000 troops to Korea. The 
immediate dividend of his investment was the association of Turkey
267with NATO.
Here, Tamkog presents the Korean War as an ‘opportunity’ to certify Turkey’s ‘solidarity 
with the West’. In this way, the Korean War became a means of ‘collective identity 
formation’ m the face of a common threat.^*’* Furthermore, Tamko§ argues that it was of 
great benefit for Turkey to participate in the war since in the aftermath of the war Turkey 
was accepted to NATO.
Bayiilken, “Turkey and the United Nations,” 100 
Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 96. 
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In line with Tamkoç’s view. Şükrü Elekdağ (retired ambassador) associates 
Turkey’s NATO membership with its participation in the Korean War. He writes: “After 
Turkish participation in the Korean War, Turkey...became a member of NATO, 
benefiting from strong American support”.^ *^^ Accordingly, the respective statements 
attach the Korean intervention an instrumental rationale. They maintain that Turkish 
support in the war provided Turkey’s acceptance to NATO.
Seyfi Taşhan, the Director of the Foreign Policy Institute, adopts the same line of 
reasoning for Turkey’s participation in the Korean War: “[TJurkish participation in the 
Korean War and the skillftil diplomacy that was followed culminated in the membership 
of...Turkey...within NATO”. What all these statements suggest is that, poUc)miakers
viewed Turkey’s participating in the Korean intervention as a means for Turkey’s 
acceptance as a ‘Western’ state. In other words, the common argument of these three 
respective statements is that Turkey’s ‘contributions’ in the war enabled its identification 
with the West. Consequently, the representations of Turkey as a “‘dependable’ ally and a 
crucial part of the US-led collective security effort” were aimed at providing Turkey’s 
acceptance to NATO.^^'
Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 91.
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5.3.2 USSR as the ‘Other’ of Turkey
As argued before, the conflict between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ dominated the political 
order after the Second World War. This was the case in Turkey as well, where the 
foundational texts of foreign policy discourse were shaped by the US-USSR 
confrontation, illustrated in the form of an East-West conflict. In what follows, excerpts 
from these foreign policy texts are examined. They manifest how the Cold War was 
represented and the Soviets were depicted as the ‘other’.
The worsening relations between Turkey and the USSR after the Second World 
War and the subsequent application of Turkey to enter NATO are mostly associated with
272Soviet demands on Turkish territories:
Ever since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish 
leaders, Atatürk and İnönü had considered the Turco-Soviet relations 
as the bedrock of Turkish foreign policy. Ever mindful of the territorial 
designs of the Soviets on Turkey and the Soviet drive toward the 
Mediteranean and Middle East, Atatürk and İnönü saw to it that 
Turkey did not remain isolated against the Soviet Union. To that end 
they established friendly relations with the major powers of Europe.^’^
This utterance traced back the strained relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey to the
establishment of the Turkish Republic, thereby representing the Soviets as a foundational
threat. The ‘Soviet threat’ is shown as the basic reason for Turkey’s search for close
relations with the European states. It is further argued by Sezai Orkunt (retired Admiral)
that
In 1945 the Soviet government put forth some stipulations for Turkey to renew the Turco-Soviet 
Friendship Pact of 1925. These were, the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviets, the 
grant of bases on the Turkish Straits to the Soviets, and the revision of the Montreux Convention on 
Straits that would engender greater Soviet control on the Straits. Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy 
During the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
179-180.
Tamko9 , “The Impact of the Truman Doctrine,” 19.
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Turkey had joined the North Atlantic Alliance as a result of the Soviet 
demand for military bases on the Turkish Straits. This demand is one 
that would entirely destroy Turkish independence. There is, as yet, no 
change in the conditions to lead Turkey to think otherwise.^’“*
Here, it is argued that the territorial allegations of the Soviets constituted the major
reason behind Turkey’s asking for cooperation with the Western states and NATO. These
allegations are understood and depicted as a threat to ‘Turkish independence’ that were
seen to undermine the state’s sovereignty. Arguing that ‘[tjhere is, as yet, no change in
the conditions to lead Turkey to think otherwise’, Orkunt represents the conditions in the
outset of the Cold War as continuing in the 1970s,^^  ^ during the period of détente in
East-West relations. As such, Orkunt causes the Cold War narrative of the 1940s to
endure in the 1970s. He demonstrates the permanence of Turkey’s policy towards the
Soviet ‘other’ across time. Because identity is not a situational feature of the state, he
locates its enduring character in time. In other words, he upholds a narrative to sustain a
particular account of the self (Turkey). As Thomas Banchoff argues,
[tjhrough narratives, the roots of a state’s relations with other states 
and institutions and their present situations are depicted. In this manner, 
narrative discourse defines ‘who we are’ by way of articulating ‘where
we have been’. 276
To uphold a narrative means to sustain a particular account of the self. As long as this 
narrative makes sense to others, as well as the self, the identity of the self is maintained in 
public domain. This point is important in that, the perpetuation of the master narrative of 
the Cold War—that represented the Soviet Union as the ‘other’ of the Western ‘self— 
engendered a justification for Turkey’s continuing cooperation with the West. This means
Sezai Orkunt, “The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey,” Foreign Policy 4:1 (1974): 87. 
The article was published in 1974.
91
to say that, through the NATO narrative, Turkish policymakers enhanced the bounds of 
identification with the West.
Kamran İnan (former senator and diplomat), in line with Orkunt’s argument, 
maintained that
Turkey wanted to join the organization right from the beginning 
because she felt that she was in danger, claims were made against her 
territories and shadows were cast over her sovereignty, and she found 
resistance against these threats all by herself to be rather difficult....[As 
a result,] we forced the door in order to enter...[NATO], and this has 
proved to be a very wise decision.^’’
Accordingly, İnan finds the most effective resistance against the Soviet allegations within
the security guarantee of NATO, which for him proved to be ‘a very wise decision’. This
line of reasoning was also picked up by Haluk Bayülken. Bayülken, after noting the
Soviet demands on Turkish territory went on to argue that,
Soviet attempts to expand their empires to Anatolia and the Middle 
East determined Turkey’s basic policy lines during the decade following 
1946.
The ideological orientation of the Turkish leaders ruling the 
Republic were directed to the democratic principles of the 
West....Ankara made every effort on her part to maintain friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the post war 
developments induced Turkey to seek full participation in the military, 
political and economic system of Atlantic and European integration.^’*
All these arguments are consistent with what Bradley Klein calls ‘the basic story’”  ^ on
the creation of NATO, which justified the establishment of the organization on the
grounds
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that a war-tom and war-exhausted Western Europe could not, on its 
own resources, mobilize a successful response to the challenge posed 
by postwar communism, a challenge posed in the dual form of political 
subversion and Stalin’s armed forces.280
This politics of rationalization justified Turkey’s participation in a collective response
against the ‘Soviet threat’. By positioning Turkey against the Soviets, the ties linking the
state to the West were enhanced. Thus, as the ‘other’ of Turkey, the Soviets became the
basic constitutive component of Turkey’s Cold War identity.
However, it is unclear whether Turkey approached the West because it saw the
Soviets as an ‘other’, or vice versa. A different reading of Turkish foreign policy may
bring to view the other side of the coin. An alternative reading might be that since Turkey
wished to approach the West, it ‘chose’ to represent the Soviets as the ‘other’. In both
manners, however, Soviet territorial claims were represented as the legitimizing cause
behind Turkey’s search for close relations with West.
We should problematize these threat perceptions. The ‘Soviet threat’ became
instrumental in associating Turkey with the Western side of the East-West conflict. This
choice aimed at a particular political end. As Thomas Risse argues,
[tjhreat perceptions do not emerge from a quasi-objective international 
power structure, but actors infer external behavior from the values and 
norms governing the domestic political processes that shape the 
identities of their partners in the international system....Soviet 
power.. .became threatening precisely because Moscow’s domestic 
order identified the Soviet Union as ‘the other’.
Accordingly, Turkey chose the Soviet Union as the ‘other’, as it did not possess the
qualities to become part of ‘us’. The basic requirements to become part of ‘us’ (the
280 Klein, “How the West Was One,” 312.
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West) were dedication to Western values such as modernity, democracy, freedom and 
market economy that the Soviets state system was said to lack.
The territorial claims and the characteristics ascribed to the Soviets were 
represented as carrying a considerable weight of danger. It is through the process of 
representing the Soviet state system in opposition to the Western state system that the 
Soviet Union was made the ‘other.’ By way of the ‘threat’ it was supposed to pose, the 
Soviets were of concern to policymakers in formulating Turkey’s posture in the world. 
NATO was represented as a political instrument of the Cold War that aimed at blocking 
Soviet expansionism and communism.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union was illustrated as the initiator of Cold War and in
this way, the basic rationale behind the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance. As
Muharrem Nuri Birgi (former ambassador) argued in his following statement,
[t]ime has shown that the principal factor leading the highly developed 
powers in Western Europe to firmly embrace their less developed allies 
within NATO...was the fear for life created by the probability of an 
armed invasion by Soviet Russia.^*^
Like Birgi, Duygu B. Sezer argued that “the raison d’etre of the Atlantic Alliance is the 
existence of the ‘Soviet threat’”.^ ®^ These statements indicate that Soviet territorial claims 
were the main motive behind Turkey’s search for Western assistance and its participation 
in the Western power structure. In a similar vein, it is stated that “NATO was conceived 
as a defensive alliance borne out of the will of its members to resist communist
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. Peter Katzenstein ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 367.
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expansion”, and that “the Soviet Union was aggressively pursuing the goal of creating 
a new communist world order by direct and indirect means of intinoidation, subversion 
and conquest”.^ ®^ Therefore, NATO was represented as having been “established as a 
result of the Cold War”,^ *'’ “against intimidation, pressure, and aggression by Communist 
Russia”."**’ These are the reasons why İnan thinks, “many people would admit the truth of 
what Mr. P.H.Spoak, former Belgian Prime Minister, said: ‘The founder of NATO is 
Stalin’”.’*^
The images of Soviet ‘repression’ and ‘totalitarianism’ used by Turkish
policymakers are further expressed in the following paragraph:
The communist world is growing and gaining in strength. This 
increasing strength facilitates the operating of geopolitical rules in 
favour of the Soviet Union. H.J.Macinder’s fsicl “world island and 
heartland” concept which was adopted by the geopolitical school of 
Nazi Germany before the Second World War is now being applied by
284
289the Soviet Union.
Thus, Orkunt bolsters the negative image of the Soviets by drawing a correlation between 
Soviet politics and the expansionist policy of Nazi Germany. In other words, Orkunt’s 
representation places the Soviet Union in the same category with Hitler’s Germany. 
Soviet ‘expansionism’, whether or not it points to any concrete reality, is tied to a loathed 
period of German history in order to ascribe the Soviets fixed, stable and unpleasant
Publisher, Foreign Policy 4:1 (1974), Introduction.
Tamkoç, “The Impact of the Truman Doctrine,” 18.
Altemur Kılıç, “International Relations in a Changing World,” Foreign Policy 1:2 (1971): 137. 
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characteristics. This politics of exclusion contributes to representations of the Soviets in
particular ways and the expression of a common identity vis-à-vis the socialist other, as
observed in Sezai Orkunt’s statement:
The accusation of ’imperialism’ which the Soviet Union throws at the 
West and particularly at the US is an expression motivated by the 
fanatical view which the Soviet regime has subconsciously bred....
[T]here is no [such a] policy...in the West. The members of the 
alliance are opposed, for example, to the colonial policy of Portugal.
If it is to be claimed that imperialism has now slid into other 
areas, then it would be necessary to concede that the Soviet Union, 
with the applications of its entire policy, is an imperialist state. The 
Soviet behaviour up to date is in conformity with the above 
definition.^^®
This statement portrays the USSR as an ‘imperialist’ state striving for further expansion. 
Orkunt also argues that the principle of ‘peaceful coexistence’ initiated by the USSR is a 
“propaganda oriented precept”.^^ ' Instead, Khrushchev’s argument that “we shall bury 
you” is viewed as the “truthful explanation of what is behind the Russian mind and 
constitutes the substance of the entire Russian foreign policy”.^ ^^  This appears to be more 
consistent and appropriate a Soviet intention for Orkunt. Accordingly, the endurance of 
NATO is legitimized in the face of Soviet desires.^^^ Through moral justifications of 
devaluing the Soviet system and emphasizing the moral superiority of the West, the 
authors tried to legitimize the politics of excluding the Soviets and taking a collective 
stand against it.
However, what is problematic in aU these statements is that, there is no empirical 
evidence presented as a justification for the capacity of the Soviet threat. The authors
Orkunt, ‘The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey,” 84. 
Orkunt, ‘The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey,” 80. 
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present no criteria to check the limits of Soviet threat, leaving aside somewhat ambiguous 
expressions such as,
the frightening scale of increase in Soviet arms, their establishment of 
naval superiority in all seas...their...activities for creating division 
among the allies and...for destroying every one of them...should be 
considered as evidences...that the danger of Soviet invasion is [not]
294over.
These are statements presenting no data, but supplying Turkish foreign policy discourse 
with “the codes of attribution and intentioniility which were to guide”^^  ^ the policies 
toward the Soviets. Such texts provided the ‘interpretive grounds’^^*" upon which authors 
portrayed a specific sight of the self (Turkey) and the other (the Soviets). What is at issue 
here is not the actual military capabilities and intentions of the Soviets. Rather, it is 
argued that this ‘interpretive scheme’ gave priority to particular aspects of ‘Soviet 
behavior’ over others, “and thereby disable[d] competing accounts which might be more 
critical o f T u r k i s h  foreign policy.
We should take a critical look at the Cold War representations of the Turkish 
foreign policy discourse. Although the Cold War was initiated as a military conflict 
between the two blocs, comments related to the Soviet social and political life 
overweighed those related to Soviet military capabilities. This is because the military 
contention of the Cold W ar“ derive[d]...its power from...[its] alfinity with widely 
circulated representations of cultural and political life”. In this sense, it was an
Orkunt, ‘The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey,” 80.
Birgi, “Developments within the Atlantic Community,” 73.
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‘imaginary war’^ ^^  in which Turkey found itself, where the West came to believe in a 
Soviet ‘threat’, and where the ways of overcoming this threat were presented as ‘military 
preparedness’, belief in nuclear weapons to provide protection, ‘anti-communism,’ and 
‘Western unity’.
Bradley Klein, building upon the assumption that the narrative of ‘Soviet threat’ 
was a constitutive element in the “creation and perpetuation of NATO”, suggests that the 
Western military strategy was not directed against a specific ‘Soviet force’, but to the 
“fears of vulnerability which attended the uncertainties of the postwar order”.^ '*’ Creating 
in the first place an ‘other’ whose ‘way of life’ was absolutely different from that of the 
self made it easier to draw the “boundaries and limits of Western identity” . I n  this way, 
the representations of the Cold War in Turkish foreign policy as a struggle between 
different identities becomes significant.
5.3.3 NATO as a Western Security Community
It is argued earlier that Turkey’s entry into NATO constituted a critical moment in its 
identification with the West, for it was more a ‘cultural undertaking’ ”^^  than a military 
one. In this sense, NATO was widely represented as a security community, which 
manifested the common values shared by its members. İnan, states this point aptly:
Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict (Cambridge: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990) 109.
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Our membership in NATO is, first of all, an important stride in our 
westernization movement. We have obtained a place and a say within 
the Atlantic community. The frontiers of Europe now begin from 
Eastern Turkey. In the context of our historical development, this 
constitutes an important achievement and a milestone. In this world of 
ours that has been made smaller due to advances in... techno logy, 
nations are compelled to come together and form solidarity 
groups....[T]he countries which have similar political systems, and 
close values and views of life and common intrests [sic1 generally come 
together. The cooperation...grows in time and creates an atmosphere 
of community. This has been the case in NATO.^*^
In this statement, İnan represents Turkey’s NATO membership along with the cultural
dimension it signifies. In İnan’s terms, Turkey’s membership in NATO is a step taken in
the efforts to Westernize the country, thus it is defined as ‘an important achievement and
a milestone’ in Turkey’s ‘westernization movement’. Viewed as such, NATO becomes
part of an endeavor to construct Turkey’s Western identity. This identity indicates “the
making of a whole way of life and a distinct civilizational project” in which Turkey
took part. For İnan, the acceptance of Turkey to the Atlantic Community is a
confirmation of Turkey’s Westernness by leading Western states.
İnan, in a sense considers NATO as a ‘security community’. A security 
community is a group of states united around a set of ‘core values’^ '’'’ and “normative 
understandings across [their] national boundaries’’^ ®^ that engenders “a sense of ‘we- 
ness’”. Security communities are socially constmcted entities that are established upon 
intersubjective understandings and common norms. Their constructedness derives from
inan, “Turkey and NATO,” 72.
Klein, “Beyond the Western Alliance,”204.
Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” 
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the fact that, they are established and maintained through “communication, discourse and 
interpretation”. T h e  ‘mutual recognition’^ '® of specific patterns of behavior has a 
constitutive effect on the construction of the community’s common identity. Thus, a 
‘cognitive structure’ is developed where members express their identities and interests 
identical with those of the community.
As Gülnur Aybet has argued, the Western Security Community (NATO) cannot 
be limited to its material/military dimensions, but must be analyzed within a broader 
cultural context. For Aybet, members of this community are tied up with social and 
cultural links as well as their military commitments. Building upon this argument to 
analyze Turkey’s membership, she states that the Western Security Community 
represents a particular ‘way of life’, where Turkey participates.®" That ‘way of life’ is 
composed of Western values shared by members of the community. İnan’s argument is an 
example of what Aybet says. He represents NATO as a ‘solidarity group’ consisting of 
states sharing common ‘political systems’, ‘close values’, ‘views of life’ and ‘interests’. 
For İnan, through cooperation among these states, ‘an atmosphere of community’ has 
been created, an understanding evaluating NATO as a security community. Accordingly, 
İnan identifies Turkey with the Western collective identity.
Alexander Wendt’s definition of collective identity is a useful example to develop 
inan’s argument. Wendt defines a collective identity as a means of identification for
Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities,” 258.
John Gerard Ruggie. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52;4 (1998): 870.
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members of a group who have internalized a common culture and have an interest in 
maintaining it.^'^ He sees the prerequisites of any collective identity formation (whether 
within or outside international relations) to be the same: “redefining the boundaries of 
Self and Other so as to constitute a ‘common in-group identity’ or ‘we-feeling’”. '^  ^
Accordingly, · İnan, arguing that the ‘Ifontiers of Europe’ had come to include Turkey 
after its accession to NATO, is representing the state as part of Western collectivity.
Güven Erkaya (late Vice Admiral) considered, though implicitly, NATO as a
security community as well. He wrote:
I am not one of those who consider NATO to be solely a military 
organization, of those who do assume and argue that the diminishing 
military threat from the Warsaw Pact renders NATO obsolete. I believe 
this argument to be misleading, ignoring as it does the dominant role of 
NATO’s political functions. I believe NATO was established to 
demonstrate the political will and cohesion of Western society to those 
who threatened its interests within the defined Alliance area. NATO has 
connected the two sides of the Atlantic by establishing and reinforcing a 
common political cause which has preserved its integrity and withstood 
changes in the Government of member countries.^'"*
Beside pointing to NATO’s military aspects, Erkaya argues that one should not lose sight
of the political features of the organization. As he maintains, the basic reasons bringing
NATO countries together had been political ones. NATO is argued to be established
upon the common interests o f the ‘Western society’. Thus, NATO is represented not
simply as a military organization, but as an alliance possessing the cultural characteristics
of a security community.
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Osman Olcay (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) regarded NATO membership 
as one of the ‘cornerstones’ in Turkey’s relations with the West (the other being relations 
with the European Economic Community), and considered the alliance as a security 
community as well. He wrote:
The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance constitutes a framework which 
provides the means for conducting our cooperation with the Western 
countries in the areas of security and foreign policy in an effective way 
and on the basis of mutual respect and interest. The constructive role 
which the Alliance plays in the realization of peace on the European 
continent, to which we belong, has an aspect which corresponds to our
315own arms.
Here, NATO is depicted as the social normative structure through which Turkey 
conducts its relations with the Western states. Olcay attaches to the Northern Alliance the 
role of securing peace in Europe. Since Olcay views Turkey as a European state, he links 
NATO members’ interests in securing peace in Europe to Turkey’s interests. In other 
words, Olcay defines Turkey’s identity and interests as identical with those of the 
Western states. Thus, Turkey’s identity and interests become endogenous to processes of 
representing Turkey as a Western state by way of its membership in NATO.
In line with Olcay’s argument, Seyfi Taşhan (Head of the Foreign Policy Institute) 
states that
Turkey looked towards NATO membership as establishing a definitely 
Western identity long cherished by Atatürk...and...gave prominence to 
Allied interest which were considered as Turkish interests as well.^'^
Taşhan draws a parallel between NATO membership and Western identity. For him,
being a NATO member means being a Western state. Moreover, Taşhan regards
membership to the Atlantic Alliance as a historical and foundational aim of the Turkish
315 Osman Olcay, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 1:2 (1971): 80-81.
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Republic, as it was ‘long cherished by Atatürk’, the founder of the Republic. In this way, 
he presents the efforts towards Westernization as being in a historical continuation. 
Finally, he presents Turkey’s interests as common with its allies, and thus identifies the 
state with the collective identity represented by NATO.
General Necip Torumtay links Turkey’s search for cooperation with the West to the 
quest for a Western identity as well:
Soviet Union’s refusal to renew the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality 
and Nonaggression of 1925, the tension caused by demands on the 
Turkish Straits and territorial claims from Eastern Anatolia immediately 
after the W.W.Il and the ensuing defense requirements impelled Turkey 
to look for new arrangements for its security apart from neutrahty. This 
quest has ended in 1952 when Turkey joined NATO. This choice also 
reflects my country’s European vocation.^
Through this statement, Torumtay associates Turkey’s NATO membership not only with 
the need to cooperate in the face of Soviet claims on Turkish territory, but also with 
Turkey’s ‘European vocation’. A similar view, representing NATO membership as an 
essential component of being a European state, holds that Turkish entry to the 
organization
not only did end the Turkish anxieties caused by the change in the 
friendly Soviet policy to the Repubhc since 1939, but also brought 
Turkey to the Western security system as a fully recognized European
state. 318
For Kurat, Turkey’s acceptance to NATO was an indication that Turkey was recognized 
as a European state. Through his above statement, Kurat placed Turkey in an equal 
position with other Western states. According to him, by way of membership to the
Tajhan, “Turkey’s Relations with the USA,” 16.
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Alliance, Turkey secured both its borders against Soviet aggression and its place among
the Western states. A similar argument was presented by Metin Tamko9, who argued that
[w]hen Turkey became a member of NATO, President Bayar’s success 
was twofold; he not only obtained a formal commitment from the 
United States to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union, but he also 
secured formal acceptance of Turkey into what was then known as the 
‘Western-Christian-Democratic family of European Nations’ which 
hitherto had kept the door shut to the Moslem Turks of the Middle
319East.
Tamkoç, like Kurat, argued that NATO membership provided not only a means for 
preventing the ‘Soviet threat’, but also the ‘formal’ evidence that Turkey was a member 
of the ‘Western-Christian-Democratic family of European Nations’. In these respective 
statements above, the authors define Turkey’s interests as identical with those of other 
members of the alliance and posit the state within the framework of NATO identity, 
which, in turn, was regarded as an affirmation of Turkey’s EuropeanAVestern identity. As 
“shared international and transnational understandings, identities...norms”^^ ° and “shared 
political purposes or interests”^^ ' of its members have constituted the foundations of 
NATO as a security community, Turkey’s membership attested to the ‘fact’ that Turkey 
was a Western state.
A related statement defining the core values constituting the basis of the Western 
Security Community is expressed by Turan Güneş (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) as 
follows: “The r6al strength of the NATO countries is formed by their solidarity based on 
democracy and respect of human rights, social progress and justice”.^ ^^  Turan Güneş put
Tamkoç, “The Impact of the Truman Doctrine, 30.
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forth as the core values bringing states together in NATO as their ‘modern’ state 
structures, i.e. their dedication to Western ideals such as democracy, human rights, social 
progress and rule of law. In a sense he regarded NATO membership as—what Alexander 
Wendt calls—a ‘type identity’. That is, membership to the alliance was viewed as 
referring to the commonalities among the allies in “behavioral traits, attitudes, values, 
skills...[and] opinions”.^ ^^  For Güneş, NATO was an alliance speaking for a ‘modern’, 
‘industrial’ and ‘capitalist’ way of life striving for ‘progress’ and ‘development’, viewed 
as the “norm[s] for global civilization”.^ '^'As such, NATO was seen not just as a military 
alliance standing against the ‘threat’ the USSR produced, but also as a means of 
identification for the ‘Western Civilization’ denoting the common cultural traits of its
325members.
These statements indicate that, part of NATO strategy was viewed as securing a 
‘modem’, ‘civilized’ and ‘democratic’ collective identity, and thus constructing the 
‘West’, in opposition to the ‘undemocratic’, ‘communist’, ‘authoritarian’ ‘East’. In this 
way, security was established along cultural l i n e s . B y  looking at Turkey’s elites’ 
NATO discourse, we can observe how organizations constitute identities by way of 
demanding conformity to the norms of a common identity. Linking a set of values and 
Western hberal principles to NATO membership, the authors presented a particular 
picture of the organization, which enabled Turkey’s identification with the West.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 225. 
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5.3.4 Turkey’s Cold-War Identity: Role Constructions
Turkey’s identification with the West by means of its NATO membership should also be 
analyzed by considering the roles adopted within the organization. This point deserves 
special attention since it is Turkey’s ‘role-identity’ that confines the boundaries of its 
behavior and the mutual expectations of other states. The roles accorded to Turkey 
settled Turkey into its ‘unique’ position vis-à-vis ‘others’, whether in the sense of friends 
or foes. In the following excerpts, statements ascribing Turkey a particular ‘role identity’ 
in opposition to the Soviet Union’s ‘counter-role’^ *^ are presented.
İnan, in the following comment, defined Turkey’s role in NATO as one o f an 
essential military ally, which contributed to peace by preventing the Soviet danger from 
expanding:
Turkey has occupied an important role [in NATO] and made important 
contributions [to peace as a deterrent force]. If Turkey today is 
represented at the European Security and Cooperation Conference in 
Geneva, and at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Conference 
in Vienna and has a word in these conferences and gained the 
opportunity to defend its national interests, this is the result o f our 
membership in NATO.
Our collaboration in the military field has been to the advantage 
of aU parties and has proved to be beneficial for peace. The 
determination and decision of aU powers to react jointly against 
common danger has preserved peace and has created the most powerful
deterrent force in the world. 329
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inan saw Turkey’s NATO membership as beneficial both to the organization and to
Turkey, as they shared common interests and the “security of each [state w as]...
perceived as the responsibility of all”.^ ®^ For İnan, NATO membership has not only
granted Turkey a say in the international fora, but also rendered it an indispensable
partner for the protection of ‘peace’. In this way, Turkey was no more viewed as “[t]he
sick man of the East” but a “strong and dependable power of the West”, which can make
us only ‘proud’. İnan maintains that “we have contributed to the preservation of peace,
and we have played a constructive role”.^ ^^
By the same token, Orkunt pointed to Turkey’s contributions to NATO. He
argued that, by means of the secure border Turkey created in the face of Soviet
expansionism, and as an “advance warning and alarm platform”, Turkey contributed to
the protection of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and thus the Western world.^^^
These were presented as the reasons making Turkey a significant ally that deserved
appreciation.^^'* Orkunt defined Turkey’s role as an ‘ally’ which indicated Turkey’s
strategic partnership with the Western democracies. In trying to explain why NATO
membership was indispensable for Turkey, Orkunt argued that
[w]ith this geography, neutrality outside the blocks...is not possible. A 
Turkey outside NATO can hardly save itself from falling into 
Moscow’s orbit. If Turkey does not want to sail in Moscow’s orbit it 
has to preserve its place in Western Europe, not be affected by adverse 
propaganda, and keep in step with the West.^^^
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Orkunt, viewing Moscow as an ‘orbit’ that pulled states through ‘adverse propaganda’,
situated the Soviets in opposition to the West—to the privileged and desired destination.
Arguing that the alternative to being Western was “falling into Moscow’s orbit”, he built
an either/or dichotomy between the two choices that he saw as mutually exclusive. He
located Turkey within the Western group of states. The reasons behind such a division
seemed unproblematic for Orkunt and he took them for granted, since such bifurcations
were regarded as both natural and unchanging.
With reference to Turkey’s role in NATO, Birgi stated that there were special
requirements to fulfill in order to remain as part of Europe and NATO:
[I]f we are a part of Europe and if we are a member of the Atlantic 
Community, all that this necessitates should be carried out. The 
problem is beyond being an issue of pride or prestige. It is a matter of 
serving the needs of our foreign policy and of our basic interests.^^*’
Birgi argued that being a part of Europe and NATO brought many responsibilities to the
state. The fulfillment of the requirements of NATO membership were viewed as
important in meeting the requirements of Turkish foreign policy and interests. Thus,
Turkey’s role identity was associated with a particular behavior. Birgi proceeded to
express the appropriate behavior for Turkey’s role identity as follows:
To become part of thé community formed by the developed members of 
the Atlantic Community, which is the brain and main source of the 
present civilization where technology, industry, commerce and culture 
play an extremely important role, requires an early approach to their 
level of development. Otherwise, there are bound to be differences 
between us, and the effects of these differences will be felt at the most
unexpected moments.337
Birgi, “Developments within the Atlantic Community,” 76. 
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The basic requirement, which was represented also as the prerequisite of Turkish foreign
policy, was expressed as catching up with the Western ‘level o f development’ in
technological, industrial, commercial and cultural fields.^^* For Birgi, this was the
appropriate route to follow for a state that occupied a special place within the Atlantic
Alliance. Such an approach identified the state “with a particular role...[which] limit[ed]
its behavior in accordance with the expectations and demands that role generates” .^ ^^
Necdet Tezel (former Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
viewed Turkey’s role within the alliance with reference to Turkey’s military capabilities
and territorial and demographic advantages vis-à-vis other member states:
Among the Western European countries Turkey has the largest area.
We are one of the five most populated Western European countries.
Turkey has the largest army in NATO after the United States 
and the largest frontiers with the Warsaw pact among all the NATO 
members.
Turkey’s ability to ensure an effective defense in southern flank 
of NATO and to continue to play the important role as an element of 
stability in the region is closely connected with the rapid development 
of her economic and military capabilities. Turkey is spending great 
efforts in these fields.
Turkey spends from her budget each year large sums for defense 
purposes. We are among the leading countries in NATO with respect to 
the share of defense expenditures in the budget and in the gross national
product 340
This perspective that stressed Turkey’s ‘unique qualities’ in the military field, defined 
Turkey’s role as ‘an element of stability’— a vague yet lofty expression. The repetitive 
references to military sources also pointed to Turkey’s great responsibility in the southern
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flank, which aimed at showing how legitimate and appropriate Turkey’s role in NATO 
was. Touching upon the defense spending with reference to its percentage in gross 
national product, both Turkey’s deep commitment to the alliance and its indispensable 
role as a considerable force were emphasized.
In a different article, Turkey’s geographical location was stressed as well, since it 
was deemed a significant element in according Turkey a particular role within the 
Alliance. İhsan Gürkan, a retired General, presented Turkey “as the most critical NATO 
country in the eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe”.^ '*' The merits brought by 
Turkey’s membership were further presented as follows: ‘Turkey’s place within the 
Alliance makes supply routes to client states in Africa and the Middle East insecure”.
What all these statements share in common is that they employed concepts of the 
realist tradition such as ‘national interest’, ‘common danger’, deterrent force’, effective 
defense’, ‘element of stability’ and ‘defense purposes’. All spoke of commitments, duties, 
functions and responsibilities, which indicate expectancy of a certain kind of foreign 
policy behavior. Additionally, Turkey’s role was defined as an ally and a ‘promoter of 
security’ that emphasized military capabilities and responsibilities. NATO membership 
was presented as a ‘role identity’,^ '*'* which was constituted in opposition to the ‘Soviet 
threat’. In this sense, Turkey occupied a position within the social normative structure of 
NATO that entailed particular “behavioral norms toward others possessing relevant
İhsan Gürkan, “Security Environment in the Mediterranean,” Seminar on Eastern Mediterranean 
Security, Foreign Policy 13:1-2 (1986): 32.
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counter-identities”?''^ Thus, the reproduction of the ‘Soviet threat’ in various foreign 
policy texts and discourses became a means for reconstructing Turkey’s ‘unique’ position 
and identity.
5.4 Conclusion
The “standardized rules of interpretation” '^"’ presented in the excerpts above account for 
the construction and maintenance of a particular identity of Turkey. Under these 
standardized discursive practices, a specific understanding of Turkey’s identity is 
internalized and institutionalized both in domestic and foreign politics, which in turn 
constitute a guide to foreign policy conduct. Turkish state identity was constructed in the 
first place with reference to its association with the ‘West’ and its differences from the 
‘East’, which correspond to David Campbell’s lowercase ‘foreign policy’.^ '*’ This 
understanding of foreign policy refers to the politics of exclusion and inclusion; 
constituting particular “objects as ‘foreign’” '^'®, as part of ‘them’, and particular others as 
part of ‘us’. After defining the self and other(s), Turkish foreign policy was conducted 
upon these specific actors. Turkey’s state identity was reproduced by diplomatic practices 
that corresponded to Campbell’s uppercase ‘Foreign Policy’. I n  an active process of 
interpretation, the authors espoused shared meanings of the circumstances and portrayed 
a particular picture of what they saw. In this way, discursive practices attempted to
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 227.
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construct^ perpetuate and justify Turkey’s identity, maintaining that Turkey belonged to 
the ‘West’.
The ‘Soviet threat’ was the ‘constitutive other’ of Turkey’s identification with the 
West. However, the statements above are far frorh answering what constituted the Soviet 
threat. Threats were presented as the ideology (communism) and military expansionism 
of the Soviet Union that were at the same time introduced as the raison d ’etre for 
establishing NATO. But the empirical grounds of this threat remain unclear. As Bradley 
Klein argues, “in the absence of reliable inteUigence estimates was a series of discursively 
constructed claims about the nature of the Soviet totalitarian state and about its 
implacable global purposes”."^ *^^ The arguments published in the journal Foreign Policy are 
in line with this understanding. They maintain that the Soviets produced a significant 
threat to the independence and integrity of Turkey. However, they introduced no 
credential for the capacity of the Soviet military ‘threat’.
To reiterate Nizar Messari’s argument, ‘national political identity’ is produced 
and reproduced after contact with both the allies and the enemies that constitute two 
groups of ‘others’. T u r k e y ’s identification with the NATO allies was a positive 
identification, whereas the Soviet Union as the ‘enemy’ constituted a negative 
identification for Turkey. The oppositions created in Turkish foreign policy discourse 
with reference to the ‘Soviet threat’ are appropriately presented in Michael Shapiro’s 
words: “A self construed with a security-related identity leads to the construction of
Campbell, Writing Security, 69.
Klein, “How the West Was One,” 313.
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otherness on the axis of threats...to that security”.^ ^^  Following Shapiro, it could be 
argued that Turkey’s Cold War identity was a ‘security-related identity’ constructed upon 
the threat the Soviet Union supposedly produced. Differentiating the characteristics 
ascribed to the Soviets from those of Turkey’s, Turkey’s identity was represented by way 
of ‘what it was not’. On the other hand, “affirming the links and characteristics that make 
that specific other an ally”,^ ^^  Turkey’s identification with other NATO members was 
enhanced.
Michael J.Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and 
Policy Analysis (Madison: Uniyersity of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 101-102.
Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” 227.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
Turkey’s membership to NATO constitutes one of the milestones in the efforts to identify 
Turkey with the West during the Cold War. Building upon the argument that states’ 
identities are constructed through the foreign policy discourses of elites, this thesis 
analyzed the construction of Turkey’s Western identity through NATO discourse during 
the Cold War. The thesis maintained that Turkey’s membership to NATO became 
instrumental in the efforts of the Turkish elite to locate Turkey on the side of Western 
nations in the face of the Soviet ‘threat’. By ascribing cultural characteristics to the 
organization, the elites portrayed NATO membership as an indication of being a part of 
the ‘West’. Thus, they represented Turkey as a member of the Western ‘self, in 
opposition to the Eastern ‘others’ that were viewed as the Warsaw Pact countries. 
Drawing on these self/other representations in Turkish foreign policy, the thesis explored 
the social construction o f the ‘iron curtain’ between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’, and how 
Turkey was depicted by foreign policy elites as playing its part on the Western scene.
The thesis suggested that states’ foreign policies could be understood and studied 
in a new way different from conventional studies. State identity is employed as a useful 
analytical concept for studying the construction of Turkey’s Western identity. It is 
maintained, however, that the concept of state identity does not have a fixed and stable 
definition, but is subject to social interaction and interpretation. Challenging mainstream 
International Relations theories, which take the state as a given and unitary entity, this 
thesis argued that states are socially constructed through foreign policy representations as 
well as practices. States are viewed as unfinished entities, always in a process of
reproduction. The construction of Turkey’s Western identity is analyzed with reference to 
the foreign policy discourses on Turkey’s membership to NATO during the Cold War. 
The thesis examined how NATO was widely viewed as an organization manifesting a 
Western collective identity. As such, the way Turkey’s membership to the organization 
was represented as an indication of Turkey’s ‘Westemness’ is analyzed.
Employing the constructivist theory in IR, this thesis adopted a sociological 
perspective to study International Relations. As stated above, constructivism is an 
approach that theorizes the world based on how human beings see the world, rather than 
explaining what is actually ‘out there’. Constructivism argues that humans see the world 
through particular perspectives, and that what we see ‘out there’ is developed in 
interaction with others. It is an approach that examines the intersubjective dimension of 
human action that is directed towards lending significance to the world. As such, 
constructivism does not view reality as objective but as constructed through the 
interpretations and social interactions among actors.
Constructivist accounts of IR demonstrate how claims of truth are bom out of 
historical understandings and social networks, how they are legitimized through 
discursive practices and operated in the service of particular ideologies to fashion 
structures of power and privilege. They offer a new way of seeing what is taken for 
granted by mainstream theories. Bringing issues such as the interaction between material 
and social factors and the significance of intersubjective understandings to the forefront, 
constructivism provides a useful framework for analyzing concepts such as identity, 
interests, norms and change, which have been central to this thesis. Instead of taking the
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circumstances that constrain actors for granted, constructivism problematizes the making 
of these circumstances.
The study of the social construction of identities is a significant component of 
constructivist research, which this thesis is an example o f The thesis examined the social 
construction of identities—one of the central issues constructivism tries to apprehend. 
Identities, as products of deliberate calculation, are considered as situational and 
relational social constructs. The thesis analyzed identity formation with reference to the 
differences between essentialist and constructivist approaches. It pointed to the basic 
difference as the one-way causal logic of essentialist accounts that take identity as given. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of political processes in 
the construction of identities, the mutual relationship between identity and interests and 
the malleability of identity. In this way, the thesis viewed identity not as an ever existing 
and unchanging phenomena like the essentialist approaches do, but observed the political 
motives behind its social construction. The thesis treated the concept of identity as a 
political issue (that is part of a representational practice through which the self-images of 
actors are constructed), rather than a taken-for-granted reality. The social construction of 
state identity is examined and used as an analytical concept in examining the construction 
of Turkey’s Western identity..
Conceptions of identity guide action and mobilize foreign policy behaviors of 
states. These conceptions are produced through discourses. A discourse is defined as a 
specific meaning system wherein various actors’ views are in continuous interaction. It is 
argued that the discour.se of Westernization/modernization was the main axis of the 
meaning system created with regard to Turkey’s NATO membership. Thus, the politics
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of Westernizing the country revolved around the maintenance of the discourses of 
Westernization that maintained dedication to Western values. This is not to suggest that 
the discourse of Westernization went unchallenged, but that these discourses were 
articulated in a relatively autonomous realm, that is the policymaking realm, where 
policymakers had the power to privilege certain representations of Turkey’s identity over 
others.
This thesis argued that representations of state identity produce particular 
manifestations of inter-state relations, for instance cooperation or conflict. It examined 
the role of foreign policy representations in the construction of state identity in general 
and Turkey’s Western identity in particular. Foreign policy is examined as a boundary 
producing practice that draws the boundaries of the state’s particular identity and secures 
it from ‘others’. Accordingly, foreign policy is treated as representations depicting the 
state in particular ways. The thesis explored the foreign policy discourse that was 
implicated in the making of Turkey’s Western identity. How the narrative of ‘Soviet 
threat’ in Turkish foreign policy discourse was a constitutive element in the creation and 
perpetuation of Turkey’s Western identity is examined. In doing so, what this thesis has 
dealt with is not the physical existence of a ‘Soviet threat’, but the social construction and 
the meanings attached to such a ‘threat’. Practices of representation and articulations of 
danger through foreign policy are examined as the basic means through which the 
reproduction of identity is achieved. It is demonstrated how creating an ‘other’ (Soviets) 
whose way of life was different from that of the self (Turkey) made it easier to draw the 
boundaries of Turkey’s We.stem identity.
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Turkey’s foreign policy discourse was articulated by state elites, people 
responsible for the formulation and conduct of Turkish foreign policy. Since elites were 
able to frame the terms in which Turkey’s foreign relations would be discussed, debated 
and acted upon, they had the discursive authority to fix meanings and identity in relatively 
stable ways. The way Turkey was represented is' deeply indicative of the power of this 
political discourse. An example of Turkey’s foreign policy discourse takes place in the 
journal Foreign Policy, as many of its contributors consist o f Turkey’s foreign policy 
elites. A major theme in this discourse has been the representations of Turkey’s Western 
identity. Meanings attached to Turkey’s NATO membership aimed at representing 
Turkey as a modem and civilized Western state. This reveals the way each elite is 
embedded in a particular meaning system.
The thesis has dealt with the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ not in terms of fixed 
geographical settlements, but as notions created through language practices. In this sense, 
the views arguing that the notions of the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ refer not simply to 
geographical divisions of the world, but to cultural compartments separated from each 
other by practices of exclusion are demonstrated. This thesis posed critical questions as 
to how binary oppositions were employed in the construction of Turkey’s state identity 
during the Cold War. The foreign policy representations involved the privileging of the 
Turkish ‘self in the face of ‘others’. These categories created within Turkish foreign 
policy discourse secured the boundaries of Turkey’s Western identity. The ‘superiority’, 
‘rationality’ and ‘order’ of the ‘West’ in opposition to the ‘inferiority’ ‘irrationality’ and 
‘disorder’ of the ‘East’ were the self-confirming parameters of the Westernization 
discourse of Turkish foreign policy.
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The discourse of inclusion/exclusion examined in the Turkish foreign policy texts 
of the Cold War illustrates the making of the Turkish ‘self in opposition to the 
communist ‘others’. In these texts, the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ both constitute and 
undermine each other, as the notions of the ‘other/outside’ was a prerequisite for the 
constitutionrof the ‘self/inside’. Thus, identity and difference are taken as intimately 
bound up with each other. The thesis examined how the symbols for Turkey’s Western 
identity were sought in the ‘West’ where concepts such as democracy, civilization, and 
modernity were established. An active strategy of Westernization through incorporating 
Western institutions was a means of identification for Turkey with the ‘West’ while 
cutting of the ties with the ‘East’. The border that separated Turkey from the ‘East’ was 
defined in ideological terms. This border separated Turkey’s present from its past, order 
from chaos and modern from traditional. In this sense, the drawing of Turkey’s eastern 
border during the Cold War was more of an ideological issue than a geographical 
undertaking. With their “value-references tied to binary oppositions”,^ '^' policymakers 
sided with the ‘Western’ side of the world’s geographical compartments. With reference 
to its NATO membership, Turkey was defined in the category of hberal democratic 
states. NATO membership was regarded as a crucial step in the process of adopting the 
norms that were deemed relevant to becoming a Western state.
During the Cold War, identity was defined primarily along the EastAVest division 
that was designated through strategic lines. By means of ‘static geographic
Nilüfer Göle, “The Quest for the Islamic Self within Ihe Context of Modernity.” Available from 
World Wide Web http://www.ciaonel.org/book/bozdogan06.html.
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compartmentalizations’^^  ^ that divided the world into ‘East’ and ‘West’, those deemed 
different from the self were excluded from the process of socialization that brought about 
in-group cohesion. As argued above, Cold War politics in Turkey was conducted around 
the representations o f the West as the ‘self and the East as the ‘other’. In the post-Cold 
War era, however, identity is defined for the most part with respect to “historical, 
religious, cultural, and civilization-oriented” characteristics.^^*’ Since the end of the Cold 
War, we have been witnessing a debate on new formulations of role and identity for the 
Atlantic Alliance. Turkey, having lost one of the foundations its identity was established 
upon (that is the East-West confrontation), has already taken its place in these debates.
Giiven Erkaya (late Vice Admiral) argued that “ the West...[was] in the happy 
role of victor” after the Cold War.^^^ Turkey, like other members of the Western security 
system, was “proud of having ‘won’ the Cold War”.^ *^ However, as the Communist 
‘other’ and the perceived threat vanished in the early 1990s, Turkey’s identification 
became questionable.^^^ The end of the Cold War brought about not only the eradication 
of the political boundaries between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’, but also an ambivalence as 
to what these geographical locations signified in meaning and content. With regard to its 
NATO membership, Turkey has lost its relatively stable identity of the Cold War years, 
since the role accorded to it—the ‘southern bastion’—is no more viable. In other words.
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Turkey’s current place in the world in the aftermath of the Cold War is not as clear-cut as 
it was presented during the war.
Turkish foreign policy discourse during the Cold War articulated the basic points 
around which Turkey’s place in the EastAVest confrontation was framed. NATO 
discourse illustrates the attempts to side with the ‘West’ and as such construct Turkey’s 
Western identity. The ‘Westernization’ and ‘Europeanization’ of Turkey were expressed 
through participation in Western institutions and the adoption of ideas and manners from 
the West.^'’'^  Foreign policy discourses represented the adoption of Western political and 
administrative institutions as an indication that Turkey was a Western/European state. 
The theme of Westernization at the heart of NATO discourse during the Cold War has 
also been articulated with reference to Turkey’s membership to European institutions, 
such as the Council of Europe and the European Union. In the web page of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, it is stated that
Turkey began “westernizing” its economic, political and social 
structures in the 19th century. Following the First World War and the 
proclamation of the Republic in 1923, it chose Western Europe as the 
model for its new secular structure.
Turkey has ever since closely aligned itself with the West and has 
become a founding member o f the United Nations, a member of 
NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD and an associate member of 
the Western European Union. During the Cold War Turkey was part of 
the Western alliance, defending freedom, democracy and human rights.
In this respect, Turkey has played and continues to play a vital role in 
the defense of the European continent and the principal elements of its
foreign policy have converged with those of its European partners. 361
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This excerpt indicates that Turkey’s entering Westem/European organizations was 
deemed a way of identifying the state with the West. Haluk Bayiilken (former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs), for example, maintained that “[t]he Council of Europe is an 
institution within the movement of European integration which can only be participated 
in by democratic countries” .^ *’^  By way of Turkey’s membership to the European 
Council, Bayiilken represented the state as a democracy that is involved in the process 
of European integration. Osman Olcay (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) defined 
European Economic Community and NATO as the “cornerstones in our relations with 
the West”.^ *’^  He further stated that “the significance of our membership in the Common 
Market...is in harmony with Ataturk’s vision and our transitional political objectives” of 
becoming a Western state.^^ In this way, membership to Western European 
organizations was deemed as manifesting a European identity.
In recent years, the European Union (EU) discourse, serving as a 
representational practice indicating Turkey’s Europeanness replaced the NATO 
discourse of the Cold War. Representing Turkey as a European state through its long- 
lasting relations with the European Union and the efforts to make it a full member has 
become an extensive theme in Turkish foreign policy discourse. Turkey’s ‘just and 
legitimate place in Europe’ has become the major theme of a far-reaching discourse in 
Turkish foreign policy especially after the Helsinki Summit of the EU (1999) where 
Turkey was recognized as a candidate for becoming a full member of the Union. Faruk
Ü.Haluk Bayülken, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 3:1 (1973); 71. 
Osman Olcay, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 1:2 (1971): 80.
Olcay, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” 81.
122
Logoglu (ambassador, then Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) argued 
that
The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession at the 
Helsinki European Council in December 1999 ushered a new era in the 
relations between Turkey and the EU....Helsinki was in a way proof of 
the Turkish society’s European vocation and vindication of its constant 
quest over the past centuries for modernity and progress.^®^
As such, Turkey’s recognition as a candidate to membership to the EU is represented as
‘evidence’ that Turkey was successful in its quest for ‘modernity and progress’, which are
traditional Western categories. Turkey’s ‘constant quest’ for EU membership is
represented as a long-lasting effort that has begun many centuries ago. Thus, Turkey’s
association with the West is bolstered and represented as ‘natural’.
This is not to suggest that elite discourses misrepresent the world, and that they 
show things differently than they actually are. This thesis argued that things come to be 
known the way they are represented to us. Politics of representation might reveal some 
‘truths’, while concealing some others. In this regard, what this thesis suggested is not 
that there is one Turkey with a single and homogenous identity. Rather, it examined the 
processes through which Turkey’s identity was understood and represented by foreign 
policy elites in a particular way.
Just as Turkish foreign policy representations that focus on Turkey’s NATO 
membership were central to the constitution and maintenance of Turkey’s Western 
identity during the Cold War, the EU discourse has become the underlying theme of 
Turkey’s Europeanness in recent years. Turkey is now trying to enter the European
365 Faruk Logoglu, “Our Membership in the European Union,” Foreign Policy 26: 1-2 (2001): 1.
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Union. So long as identities are defined along binary oppositions that entail antagonism 
toward the ‘other’, policymakers will need to challenge new ‘others’.
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